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Information theory is widely used for analyzing a wide range of scientiﬁc and
engineering problems, including cryptography, neurobiology, quantum computing, pla-
giarism detection and other forms of data analysis. Despite the safety-critical nature
of some of these applications, most of the information-theoretic analysis is done using
informal techniques, mainly computer simulation and paper-and-pencil analysis, and
thus cannot be completely relied upon. The unreliable nature of the produced results
poses a serious problem in safety-critical applications and may result in heavy ﬁnancial
losses or even the loss of human life. In order to overcome the inaccuracy limitations
of these techniques, this thesis proposes to conduct the analysis within the trusted
kernel of a higher-order-logic (HOL) theorem prover. For this purpose, we provide
HOL formalizations of the fundamental theories of measure, Lebesgue integration
and probability and use them to formalize some of the most widely used information-
theoretic principles. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a uniﬁed measure of
information which is in turn used to deﬁne the main measures of information like the
Shannon entropy, mutual information and conditional mutual information. Further-
more, we introduce two new measures of information leakage, namely the information
leakage degree and the conditional information leakage degree and compare them with
existing measures. We illustrate the usefulness of the proposed framework by tackling
various applications including the performance analysis of a communication encoder
iii
used in the proof of the Shannon source coding theorem, the quantitative analysis of
privacy properties of a digital communications mixer and the one-time pad encryption
system using information-theoretic measures.
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Knowing ignorance is strength. Ignoring knowledge is sickness.
Lao-Tse, Tao Te Ching [6th Century BCE]
Hardware and software systems usually exhibit some kind of random or unpredictable
behavior, either because of a faulty component, interaction with an unpredictable en-
vironment or simply because of the use of a probabilistic algorithm within the system.
Due to these elements of randomness and uncertainty, establishing the correctness of
a system under all circumstances usually becomes impractically expensive. The engi-
neering approach to evaluate the performance of these systems is to use probabilistic
analysis. Furthermore, information-theoretic analysis is gaining more ground in the
study of correctness and performance of a broad range of scientiﬁc and engineering
systems. In fact, after it was ﬁrst introduced by Shannon in his seminal paper [62],
information theory has become an increasingly popular discipline in a wide range of
applications including communication, cryptography, quantum computing, plagiarism
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detection and other forms of data analysis.
Information-theoretic analysis consists in using measures of information to quan-
tify the ﬂow of information and evaluate the performance of a system or a protocol.
Examples of this analysis include the evaluation of anonymity networks and security
protocols. Anonymity networks such as Crowds [54] and Tor [20] have been proposed
to provide anonymous communication between entities in a network. Analyzing the
anonymity properties of these protocols consists in ﬁnding out how much information
an attacker can learn about the senders and receivers in the network. One way to do
so is through quantitative analysis of information ﬂow [64, 58] which allows to mea-
sure how much information about the high security inputs of a system can be leaked,
accidentally or maliciously, by observing the systems outputs and possibly the low
security inputs. Quantitative analysis of information ﬂow has also been proposed to
analyze security protocols [64]. In fact, while these protocols aim to preserve sensitive
and conﬁdential data and prevent it from being leaked or tainted, a small leakage
of information is sometimes necessary, as is the case for password checking or for a
voting protocol.
Traditionally, computer simulations and paper-and-pencil based analysis have
been used for the analysis of probabilistic systems as well as the quantitative analysis
of information. Computer simulation provides, however, less accurate results due to
the usage of computer arithmetics, such as ﬂoating or ﬁxed point numbers, that leads
to numerical approximations. In addition, it cannot handle large-scale problems due
to their enormous computer processing time requirements. The unreliable nature of
the produced results poses a serious problem in safety-critical applications, such as
2
those in secure communications, space travel, military applications, and medicine.
Paper-and-pencil analysis, on the other hand, does not scale well to complex systems
and is prone to human error.
As an alternative approach to overcome the above shortcomings, we propose
a computer-assisted technique which consists in conducting the probabilistic and
information-theoretic analysis using formal methods [2]. Formal methods are tech-
niques used to model complex software and hardware systems as mathematical enti-
ties. They are used for the speciﬁcation, analysis and veriﬁcation of these systems to
improve their reliability, design time and comprehensibility. They broadly fall into two
main categories: proof based methods, mainly theorem proving and state-exploration
methods, mainly model checking. While theorem proving is a scalable technique that
can handle large designs, model checking suﬀers from the so called state-explosion
problem which prevents its application to larger systems [40]. On the other hand,
while model checking is fully automatic, deriving proofs is a user guided technique
that requires a lot of expertise and hence can be tedious and diﬃcult.
Several probabilistic model checking tools have been developed, we mention for
example, PRISM [41] and VESTA [60]. However, in addition to the above short-
comings of model checking, this technique can only be used for systems that can be
expressed as ﬁnite state machines or Markov chains. Higher-order-logic, on the other
hand, is highly expressive and can be used to describe any mathematical relation-
ship, in particular, the mathematical theories needed to conduct the probabilistic and
information-theoretic analysis. For this reason, we propose to conduct this analysis
within the sound core of a higher-order-logic theorem prover
3
Theorem proving [30] is a ﬁeld of computer science and mathematical logic that
allows to conduct computer-assisted formal proofs of the correctness of systems and
programs using mathematical reasoning. The implementation and speciﬁcation of a
system are both expressed in terms of logical formulas and the proof of correctness
is derived from a very small set of axioms and inference rules. The soundness of
theorem proving guarantees that only valid results are provable, hence, overcoming
the inaccuracies of simulation and paper-and-pencil based techniques. We give a brief
overview of theorem proving, which we use in our work, in Section 2.2.
In order to achieve our objective of using a higher-order-logic theorem prover
to perform the information-theoretic analysis, we need ﬁrst to formalize, or write in
a formal language, all the underlying theories that are needed to express the systems
and protocols under consideration. This includes the formalization of probability
and information theory concepts in higher-order logic. In this work, we propose a
generalized higher-order-logic formalization of the underlying mathematical theories
of measure [9], Lebesgue integration [6], probability [26] and information theory [14].
Using measure theory to formalize probability has the advantage of providing a math-
ematically rigorous treatment of probability and a uniﬁed framework for discrete and
continuous probability measures. Lebesgue integration is used to develop statistical
properties of random variables and various measures of information.
Several measures of information ﬂow have been proposed in the literature. For
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instance, Serjantov [61] and Diaz et al. [19] independently proposed to use the en-
tropy to deﬁne the quality of anonymity and to compare diﬀerent anonymity sys-
tems. Malacaria [44] deﬁned the leakage of conﬁdential information in a program
as the conditional mutual information between its outputs and secret inputs, given
the knowledge of its low security inputs. Deng [18] proposed relative entropy as a
measure of the amount of information revealed to the attacker after observing the
outcomes of the protocol, together with the a priori information. Chatzikokolakis [10]
modeled anonymity protocols as noisy channels and used the channel capacity as a
measure of the loss of anonymity. Zhu and Bettati [68] used the mutual information
to deﬁne what they called anonymity degree and used it to analyze a digital MIX,
which is a communication system introduced by Chaum [11] to create hard-to-trace
communications. We introduce two novel measures of information leakage, namely
the information leakage degree and the conditional information leakage degree. We
will compare them to the existing measures and show that they have the advantage
that they not only quantify the information leakage but also describe the quality of
leakage by normalizing the measure by the maximum leakage that the system allows
under extreme situations. We show how the information leakage degrees can be used
to evaluate both the anonymity and privacy properties of protocols. We compare the
proposed information leakage degree to the anonymity degree introduced in [68] and
show that our deﬁnition is more generic.
We illustrate the practical eﬀectiveness of our work and its utilization to con-
duct information-theoretic analysis using a theorem prover, by tackling various ap-
plications including a data compression [14] application consisting of the proof of the
Shannon source coding theorem. We also evaluate the anonymity properties of an
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anonymity-based MIX channel [68] as well as the privacy properties of the one-time
pad encryption system [15].
In this thesis, we use the HOL4 theorem prover [24] for the above mentioned
formalization and veriﬁcation tasks. The main motivation behind this choice is to
build upon existing formalizations of measure [37] and Lebesgue integration [13] theo-
ries in HOL. The methodology is, however, valid for other higher-order-logic theorem
provers.
1.2 State-of-the-Art
Probabilistic analysis using formal methods have been an active research area, lately.
The most mature technique has been probabilistic model checking where several tools
have been developed. The formalization of probability and some concepts of informa-
tion theory in proof assistants have also been investigated in several related works.
Below, we present the state-of-the-art in terms of the diﬀerent theories that have been
formalized as well as a brief overview of probabilistic model checking.
1.2.1 Measure and Probability
The early foundations of probabilistic analysis in a higher-order-logic theorem prover
were laid down by Ne¸dzusiak [46] and Bialas [8] when they proposed a formalization of
some measure and probability theories in higher-order logic. Hurd [37] implemented
their work and developed a formalization of measure and probability theories in HOL.
Despite important contributions, Hurd’s formalization did not include basic concepts
such as the expectation of random variables. In Hurd’s formalization, a measure space
is the pair (A, μ); A is a set of subsets of a space X, called the set of measurable
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sets and μ is a measure function. Hence, the space is implicitly the universal set of
the appropriate type. This approach does not allow to construct a measure space
where the space is not the universal set. The only way to apply this approach for an
arbitrary space X is to deﬁne a new type for the elements of X, redeﬁne operations
on this set and prove properties of these operations. This requires considerable eﬀort
that needs to be done for every space of interest.
Hasan [31] built upon Hurd formalizations of measure and probability to verify
the probabilistic and statistical properties of some commonly used discrete [33] and
continuous [32] random variables. The results were then utilized to formally reason
about the correctness of many real-world systems including the analysis of the Coupon
Collector’s problem [34] and the Stop-and-Wait protocol [35]. Hasan’s work inherits
the above mentioned limitations of Hurd’s work. For example, separate frameworks
for handling systems with discrete and continuous random variables are required and
the inability to handle multiple continuous random variables. Another important
limitation of this work is the requirement of independence of random variables. This
assumption cannot be satisﬁed for a large class of systems involving multiple random
variables.
Abbasi [1] extended the work of Hasan by formalizing statistical properties of
continuous random variables as well as the probability distribution properties of mul-
tiple random variables and used it for the formal reliability analysis of engineering
systems using theorem proving. The results from Abbasi’s formalization are valid
only for the speciﬁc probability distributions considered. In fact, to be able to prove
7
a property of a speciﬁc random variable, the user would start with that random vari-
able and derive the proof. A better approach would be to prove a general result that
can be applied to various random variables. Furthermore, Abbasi’s work has also
the disadvantage that the results cannot be used for both discrete and continuous
random variables and inherits the limitation of requiring the independence of random
variables from Hasan’s formalization.
Based on the work of Hurd [37], Coble [13] extended the formalization of measure
theory by deﬁning the measure space as the triple (X,A, μ) allowing him to work with
an arbitrary space X and hence eliminate the above shortcoming of the formalization
of Hurd. Coble has also deﬁned probability spaces and random variables. However,
this formalization considers only ﬁnitely-valued measures and functions as it was based
on standard real numbers. Using extended-real numbers in the formalization has many
advantages. It allows us to deﬁne sigma-ﬁnite and other inﬁnite measures as well as
signed measures. It also allows to deﬁne extended-real valued functions. Furthermore,
Coble’s formalization does not include Borel spaces and hence it was not possible to
prove the properties of measurable functions. A later version of the formalization of
measure contained the deﬁnition of the Borel sigma algebra but it was deﬁned based
on open intervals instead of open sets. This limits the applications to real-valued
measurable functions.
1.2.2 Lebesgue Integration
Richter [55] ported Hurd’s formalization [37] of measure theory and probability theory
in Isabelle/HOL [51], and used it to formalize Lebesgue integration. Only real-valued
functions are considered in this work as the deﬁnition of Borel spaces was also deﬁned
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as being generated by the intervals. Deﬁning the Borel sigma algebra based on the
open sets allows to work with functions deﬁned on any topological space, such as the
complex numbers or Rn, the n-dimensional Euclidean space. Richter’s formalization
does include the main convergence theorems of the Lebesgue integral and the impor-
tant Radon Nikodym derivative, which used to deﬁne several concepts of probability
and information theories. This formalization does not support extended-valued real
functions.
Coble has also provided a nice formalization of Lebesgue integration in the HOL4
theorem prover but it was not based on the extended-real numbers and hence limiting
the scope of applications and, more importantly, it prevents us from proving various
convergence theorems and the important Radon Nikodym theorem. Furthermore, in
the formalization of Coble which lacked the Borel sigma algebra, it was not possible to
prove properties of the Lebesgue integral for arbitrary functions like the monotonicity
and linearity of the integral. Only the properties for positive simple functions were
provided. Finally, deﬁning the Borel sigma algebra using open sets, allows to prove
the properties and apply the Lebesgue integral to a large class of continuous functions,
in particular, trigonometric and exponential functions.
A formalization of the Lebesgue integral on the extended-reals has been pro-
posed in Mizar [63]. To the best of our knowledge, the Radon Nikodym derivative
and its properties as well as the Lebesgue convergence theorems have not been for-
malized in Mizar. Finally, in his work on the formalization of topology using the PVS
theorem prover, Lester [42] provided formalizations for measure and integration theo-
ries. Lester’s formalization lacks the proofs of the properties of the Lebesgue integral
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as well as the Lebesgue convergence theorems, both of which are very important to
the usability of the formalization to analyze systems properties.
1.2.3 Information Theory
Coble used his formalization of measure theory and probability to formalize some
concepts of information theory in HOL. This formalization, evidently, inherits the
above mentioned drawbacks of his formalization measure and Lebesgue integration.
In fact, the lack of extended-real numbers in his formalization, as mentioned above,
prevented him from proving the important Radon Nikodym theorem. This theorem
plays a vital role in the proof of existence of the Radon Nikodym derivative and hence
allows to prove various properties of the derivative and, by extension, all the measures
of information that use it in their deﬁnitions.
A formalization of the positive extended-reals in HOL was proposed by Hurd [38]
and has been imported to the Isabelle theorem prover. Ho¨lzl used this work to for-
malize various measures of information and the underlying theories in Isabelle, based
on the work of Coble. While this is a work in progress, the formalization that has
been published by Ho¨lzl [36] lacks the important properties of the Radon Nikodym
derivative and the Kullback-Leibler divergence and the diﬀerent measures of informa-
tion. It also does not handle signed measures or functions taking negative valued as
only positive extended-real numbers are supported.
More recently, Aﬀeldt [3] provided a simpliﬁed formalization of probability the-
ory in the Coq proof assistant [7] and used it to formalize basic concepts of information
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theory. The aim of this work was to prove Shannon’s source coding and channel the-
orems and not to provide a generalized formalization of probability or information
theory that can be used to analyze other applications.
1.2.4 Probabilistic Model Checking
In addition to theorem proving, probabilistic model checking is the second most widely
used formal probabilistic analysis method [4, 57]. Like traditional model checking [5],
probabilistic model checking involves the construction of a precise state-based math-
ematical model of the given probabilistic system, which is then subjected to exhaus-
tive analysis to verify if it satisﬁes a set of probabilistic properties formally expressed
in some appropriate logic. Numerous probabilistic model checking algorithms and
methodologies have been proposed in the open literature, e.g., [17, 50], and based
on these algorithms, a number of tools have been developed, e.g., PRISM [41] and
VESTA [60].
In addition to the accuracy of the results, another important feature of prob-
abilistic model checking is the ability to perform the analysis automatically. On
the other hand, probabilistic model checking is limited to systems that can only be
expressed as probabilistic ﬁnite state machines or Markov chains. Another major
limitation of the probabilistic model checking approach is state-space explosion [5].
Similarly, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been possible to precisely reason
about information-theoretic foundations, such as expectation, variance and measures
of information, using probabilistic model checking so far. Higher-order-logic theorem
proving, on the other hand, overcomes the limitations of probabilistic model checking
and thus allows conducting formal information-theoretic analysis of a wide range of
engineering systems but at the cost of signiﬁcant user interaction.
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1.3 Proposed Methodology
The main objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive framework to conduct
probabilistic and information-theoretic analysis of systems and protocols within the
sound core of a theorem prover, as an alternative to less accurate techniques like
simulation and paper-and-pencil methods and to other less scalable techniques like
probabilistic model checking. We provide the tools to model random components of
systems and protocols to be able to prove their desired probabilistic, statistical and
information theoretic properties. As depicted in Figure 1.1, the proposed framework
Formal proofs of system properties
Lebesgue Integration
Probability Theory Information Theory
Measure Theory
Rational Theory Topology Theory
System Model (Formal) System Specification (Formal)
Theorem Prover
System Description System Properties
Extended Real Numbers
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Proposed Framework
provides the necessary tools to mathematically express a system description and its
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desired properties in a format that is understood by the theorem prover. The frame-
work is presented in terms of theories to be developed speciﬁcally for this work but
are usable in a much wider range of applications. Lebesgue integration, for instance,
is used in this work to deﬁne statistical properties of random variables but the devel-
oped theory can also be used in the study of Fourier series and Fourier transforms.
We provide a formalization in HOL of the set of extended-real numbers R, which
is the set of real numbers augmented by the negative and positive inﬁnity. We use this
formalization as a basis for the development of the various theories of the framework
allowing us to prove several properties, mainly convergence theorems, that would not
have been possible to prove using the normal (ﬁnite) real numbers. We also provide
a formalization of the set of rational numbes Q as well as some concepts of topology
of R, necessary in our development of measure theory.
We use measure theory to formalize probability as it has the advantage of pro-
viding a mathematically rigorous treatment of probability and a uniﬁed framework
for discrete and continuous probability measures. We formalize measure theory based
on the Borel spaces allowing us to work on any topological space and prove important
properties of extended-real-valued measurable functions. To do so, we make use of
the formalization of Q and the topology of R to formalize the Borel sigma algebra in
terms of open sets.
We formalize the Lebesgue integral in HOL based on the extended-real num-
bers. Using the theories mentioned above, we prove various properties of the integral,
especially its convergence theorems. The use of extended-real numbers allows us to
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prove the important Radon Nikodym theorem and use it to deﬁne the Radon Nikodym
derivative, necessary to deﬁne most commonly used measures of information. We use
the Lebesgue integral to deﬁne various statistical properties of random variables, such
as the expectation and variance, and the diﬀerent measures of information.
We formalize probability in higher-order logic according to the Kolmogorov ax-
iomatic deﬁnition of probability [39]. This deﬁnition provides a mathematically con-
sistent way for assigning and deducing probabilities of events. It consists in deﬁning
a set of all possible outcomes, Ω, called the sample space, a set F of events which are
subsets of Ω and a probability measure p such that (Ω, F, p) is a measure space with
p(Ω) = 1. In this context, a random variable is then a measurable function and its
expectation is equal to the Lebesgue integral with respect to the probability measure.
The main goal of our framework is the information theory. The formalization
of information theory consists in using the underlying theories of measure, Lebesgue
integration and probability to develop a higher-order-logic formalization of the main
concepts and measures of information. We make use of the Radon Nikodym deriva-
tive, deﬁned in the Lebesgue integration theory, to formalize the Kullback-Leibler
divergence. The latter is then used to deﬁne most commonly used measures of in-




The main contribution of this thesis is an approach and the required formal framework
for conducting the information-theoretic analysis within the trusted kernel of a higher-
order-logic theorem prover. We propose this technique as an alternative approach
to less accurate or less scalable techniques like computer simulation and paper-and-
pencil analysis. To achieve this goal, we formalize several fundamental mathematical
theories including measure theory, Lebesgue integration, probability and information
theory. Each of these underlying theories constitute a considerable contribution to
the theorem proving community as they can be used in a wide range of engineering
and mathematical applications. They have been released in the oﬃcial distribution
of the HOL4 theorem prover [47] but they can also be adapted to any other higher-
order-logic theorem prover. We list below the main contributions of this work with
references to related publications provided in the Biography section at the end of the
thesis.
• Formalization of the extended-real numbers in HOL including the type and
operators deﬁnition as well as their properties. This formalization is used to
deﬁne the various theories of this work, but can be useful to develop a number
of other mathematical theories [Bio-Cf2].
• Formalization of measure theory over the extended-real numbers which allows
us to work with non-negative measures, signed measures as well as sigma-ﬁnite
and other inﬁnite measures. This theory includes the formalization of Borel
spaces based on open sets making it possible to deﬁne measurable functions
over any topological space. This required the formalization of basic concepts
of the topology of the set of real numbers as well as a rich formalization of the
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rational numbers in HOL [Bio-Cf2, Bio-Cf3].
• Formalization of Lebesgue integration over extended-real-numbers in HOL in-
cluding the integral deﬁnition and its properties for arbitrary functions. The
use of extended-real numbers allowed us to prove various properties and con-
vergence theorems that would not have been possible to prove with normal real
numbers [Bio-Cf2, Bio-Cf3].
• Formalization of probability theory in higher-order-logic including probability
spaces, random variables and probability mass functions. We used the Lebesgue
integration to deﬁne the statistical properties of random variables such as the
expectation, variance and covariance. We proved some classical results from the
probability theory including the Markov and Shannon inequalities as well as the
Weak Law of Large Numbers [Bio-Jr2]
• Formalization of the most commonly used measures of information including
the Shannon entropy, mutual information and conditional mutual information.
We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a uniﬁed measure of information
from which we derive all the other measures and provide simpler expressions
of these measures for the case of ﬁnite spaces. We proved the Asymptotic
Equipartition Property, an important result in information theory used in the
proof of several theorems such as the Shannon source coding theorem [Bio-Jr2].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst higher-order-logic formalization of
these information-theoretic notions which also includes their properties.
• An approach to conduct quantitative analysis of information ﬂow using a the-
orem prover and proposed two new measures of information leakage. We used
this technique to analyse the anonymity properties of an anonymity-based single
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MIX [Bio-Cf1] and later extended it to study the security performance of the
one-time pad encryption system [Bio-Jr1].
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide a brief overview
of information theory starting from quantifying uncertainty to the deﬁnition of the
diﬀerent measures of information. We also provide in this chapter an introduction to
theorem proving and the HOL4 theorem prover.
In Chapter 3, we present a formalization of the fundamental theories of measure
and Lebesgue integration in HOL, based on the extended-real numbers. In measure
theory, we formalize the basic deﬁnitions as well as the Borel spaces and use them to
verify the properties of measurable functions. Finally, we present our formalization
of the Lebesgue integral and prove its main properties.
The formalization of probability concepts is presented in Chapter 4 including the
basic deﬁnitions of probability spaces and random variables as well as their statistical
properties. We also provide a detailed formalization of the most commonly used
measures of information and their properties. Finally we provide an overview of the
ﬁeld of quantitative analysis of information ﬂow and propose two novel measures of
information leakage.
We use the proposed approach of information-theoretic analysis and the devel-
oped formal framework in the study of various applications in Chapter 5. We prove
the properties of the typical encoder as well as analyze an anonymity-based single
MIX. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the one-time pad encryption.





In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of information theory. We start by linking
uncertainty to information and use that observation to describe the diﬀerent measures
of information that have been proposed to conduct the information-theoretic analysis.
We also provide a short introduction to higher-order-logic theorem proving technology
and the HOL4 theorem prover, the proof assistant we used in our development.
2.1 Information Theory
“Real knowledge is to know the extent of ones ignorance.”
Confucius [551-479 BCE]
This statement captures concisely the relationship between knowledge or information
and uncertainty. In fact, information has been intuitively deﬁned as the reduction in
uncertainty. As a result, to come up with a measure of information, we ﬁrst need to
be able to quantify uncertainty.
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2.1.1 Quantifying Uncertainty
Any situation of uncertainty is characterized by a number n of possibilities where it
is unknown which one will be selected. Formally, such a situation can be described
by a set of possibilities S = {e1 . . . en} called a scheme of choice. We are interested in
coming up with a measure of the uncertainty in the scheme of choice S. Intuitively, the
uncertainty can be measured by the number of questions that are needed to be asked
to determine which possibility was selected. A natural choice would be the cardinality
|S| or the number of elements of S. A more clever choice, however, is log |S|, which
is the number of questions needed if we recursively partition the set into two halves
of equal size, if |S| is even. Otherwise, the number of questions needed is log |S|+ 1.
When the probabilities of the diﬀerent outcomes are known, it is possible to
come up with a measure that better describes the uncertainty induced by the diﬀerent
outcomes. First, the uncertainty measure should be a decreasing function of the
probability. In fact, the more likely the occurrence of a particular event is, the less
anticipating uncertainty its actual observation contains. Furthermore, the uncertainty
of a particular joint outcome should be equal to the sum of the uncertainties of the
individual outcomes when the outcomes are independent. This property is a form of a
Cauchy equation and the solution should be from the class of functions deﬁned by the
equation h(x) = c logb(p(x)), where c is an arbitrary constant and b is a non-negative
constant distinct from 1. The constant c should be negative in order for the measure
to be decreasing with probability. Finally, since the uncertainty is maximized when all
the outcomes are equiprobable c can be chosen to be −1. The choice of b determines
the unit of uncertainty: bit when b = 2 and nat when b = 10.
The uncertainty associated with the probabilistic scheme of choice is the average
of the uncertainties of all the possible outcomes, weighted by their corresponding
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2.1.2 Measures of Information
Information is deﬁned as the amount of reduced uncertainty. Consider a random
variable X taking values x ∈ S with probabilities p(x). The random variable describes
an experiment which outcome is uncertain. The uncertainty in this case is equal to
the entropy H(X) = −∑x∈S p(x) log(p(x)). When a certain outcome is observed, the
uncertainty is eliminated and the information gained by performing the experiment
is equal to H(X). The entropy of a random variable is then a measure of the amount
of information gained by observing the actual value of the variable.
If the experiment is carried out only partially where the actual value is not
observed but instead some event E occurs. The amount of information gained in this
case is equal to the initial uncertainty H(X) reduced by the posterior uncertainty
H(X|E). This deﬁnition can, however, result in negative information. More generally,
the reduction in uncertainty of a random variable X due to another random variable







The mutual information is a symmetric and non-negative measure of the dependence
between the two random variables. It is a special case of a more general quantity called
the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. The latter is a measure of








Using this deﬁnition, the mutual information is actually the KL divergence between
the joint probability p(x, y) and the product of marginal probabilities p(x)p(y). If the
two random variables are independent (p(x, y) = p(x)p(y)), the divergence is equal to
zero.
Information theory [62, 25] was developed as a mathematical theory for com-
munication by Claude E. Shannon to deﬁne the theoretical limits on the achievable
performance of data compression and transmission rate of communication. The limits,
being the entropy and the channel capacity, respectively, are given in terms of coding
theorems for information sources and noisy channels. Information theory has since
been used in analyzing the correctness and performance of a broad range of scientiﬁc
and engineering systems.
A higher-order-logic formalization of the most commonly used measures of in-
formation is presented in Chapter 4, based on the deﬁnition of the KL divergence.
We also prove, in Chapter 5, the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) and use
it in the proof of the Shannon source coding theorem.
2.2 Theorem Proving
Theorem proving is an approach where both the system and its desired properties are
expressed as formulae in some mathematical logic. This logic is deﬁned by a formal
system, called proof system or calculus, which deﬁnes a set of axioms and a set of
inference rules. Theorem proving is the process of deriving formal proofs from the
basic axioms and possibly intermediate lemmas using inference rules. The axioms are
usually “elementary” in the sense that they capture the basic properties of the logic’s
operators.
Proof styles are often characterized as “forward” or “backward”. A forward
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proof starts with the axioms and assumptions; inference rules are then applied until
the desired theorem is proven. A backward proof starts with the theorem as a goal and
tactics are applied to reduce the goal into simpler intermediate sub-goals. Suﬃciently
simple sub-goals are discharged by matching axioms or assumptions or by applying
built-in decision procedures.
Many theorem-proving systems have been implemented and used for all kinds
of veriﬁcation problems. The most popular proof assistants include HOL4 [24], Is-
abelle [51], ACL2 [43], PVS [48] and Coq [7]. These systems are distinguished by,
among other aspects, the underlying mathematical logic, the way automatic decision
procedures are integrated into the system and the user interface. We use the HOL4
theorem prover in our work, mainly because we build on several underlying theories
that exist in HOL4.
HOL4 Theorem Prover
The HOL4 system is a general purpose theorem prover which is capable of conducting
proofs in higher-order logic. It utilizes the simple type theory of Church [12] along
with Hindley-Milner polymorphism [45] to implement higher-order logic. HOL has
been successfully used as a veriﬁcation framework for both software and hardware as
well as a platform for the formalization of pure mathematics.
In order to ensure secure theorem proving, the logic in the HOL system is
represented in the strongly-typed functional programming language ML [52]. An
ML abstract data type is used to represent higher-order-logic theorems and the only
way to interact with the theorem prover is by executing ML procedures that operate
on values of these data types. The HOL core consists of only 5 basic axioms and
8 primitive inference rules, which are implemented as ML functions. Soundness is
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assured as every new theorem must be veriﬁed by applying these basic axioms and
primitive inference rules or any other previously veriﬁed theorems/inference rules.
HOL4 has automatic recursive type deﬁnitions, structural induction tools and
rewriting tools. The set of types, type operators, constants and axioms available in
HOL4 are organized in the form of theories. There are two built-in primitive theories,
bool and ind, for Booleans and individuals, respectively. Other important theories,
which are arranged in a hierarchy, have been added to axiomatize lists, products, sums,
numbers, primitive recursion and arithmetic. On top of these, users are allowed to
introduce application-dependent theories by adding relevant types, constants, axioms
and deﬁnitions.
HOL4 supports both forward and goal-directed backward proofs in a natural-
deduction style calculus. The user interacts with HOL4 through the functional meta-
language ML and proofs are derived by applying tactics to proof goals. A tactic
corresponds to a high-level proof step which automatically generates a sequence of
elementary inference rules necessary to justify the step.
The HOL theorem prover includes many proof assistants and automatic proof
procedures [27] to assist the user in directing the proof. The user interacts with a
proof editor and provides it with the necessary tactics to prove goals while some of
the proof steps are solved automatically by the proof decision procedures. Table 2.1
provides the mathematical interpretations of some frequently used HOL symbols and
functions, which are inherited from existing HOL theories, in this thesis.
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:: Adds a new element to a list
++ Joins two lists together
hd L Head element of list L
tl L Tail of list L
(a, b) A pair of two elements
fst First component of a pair
snd Second component of a pair
λx.t(x) Function that maps x to t(x)
{x|P(x)} Set of all x such that P (x)
{X|T} Or Univ Universal Set
{X|F} Or {} Empty Set
FINITE s s is a ﬁnite set
compl A Complement of set A
A subset B A is a subset of B
A inter B A intersection B
A union B A union B
A diff B Diﬀerence between sets A and B
e INSERT s {e} union s
s DELETE e s diﬀ {e}
disjoint A B Sets A and B are disjoint
image f A Set with elements f(x) for all x ∈ A








lim(λn.f(n)) Limit of a real sequence f
@x.t(x) Some x such that t(x) is true
CHOICE s Some x in s
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Chapter 3
Measure Theory and Lebesgue
Integration in HOL
In order to provide a formalization of probability and information theory in higher-
order logic, we need ﬁrst to formalize the fundamental theories of measure and
Lebesgue integration.
We use measure theory to formalize probability and information theory as it
has the advantage of providing a mathematically rigorous treatment of probabilities
and a uniﬁed framework for discrete and continuous probability measures. In this
context, a probability measure is a measure function, an event is a measurable set
and a random variable is a measurable function.
We use the Lebesgue integral to deﬁne the statistical properties of random vari-
ables such as the expectation, variance and diﬀerent measures of information. The
reason behind this choice over the more commonly known Riemann integral is the
uniﬁed deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral for both discrete and continuous cases as
well as the ability to handle a broader class of functions. Furthermore, the Lebesgue
integral exhibits a better behavior when it comes to interchanging limits and integrals.
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Both formalizations of measure theory and Lebesgue integral that we will present
in the next sections are based on the extended-real numbers. This allows us to deﬁne
sigma-ﬁnite and even inﬁnite measures and handle extended-real-valued measurable
functions. It also allows us to prove the properties of the Lebesgue integral and
its convergence theorems for arbitrary functions. We present a higher-order-logic
formalization of the extended-real numbers in the following section.
3.1 Formalization of Extended Real Numbers
The set of extended-real numbers R is the set of real numbers R extended with two
additional elements, namely, the positive inﬁnity +∞ and negative inﬁnity −∞. R
is useful to describe various limiting behaviors in many mathematical ﬁelds. For
instance, it is necessary to use the extended reals system to deﬁne the integration
theory, otherwise the convergence theorems such as the monotone convergence and
dominated convergence theorems would be less useful. Using the extended reals to
deﬁne the measure theory makes it possible to deﬁne sigma-ﬁnite measures and other
inﬁnite measures. With extended-real numbers, the limit of a monotonic sequence is
always deﬁned, inﬁnite when the sequence is divergent, but still deﬁned and properties
can be proven on it. The price to pay for these advantages is an increased level of
diﬃculty in the analysis and the need to prove a large body of theorems on the
extended reals and operators on them.
3.1.1 Type and Operators
An extended real is either a normal real number, positive inﬁnity or negative inﬁnity.
we use Hol_datatype to deﬁne the new type extreal as follows:
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val _ = Hol_datatype ‘extreal = NegInf | PosInf | Normal of real‘
The HOL notation x:real is used to specify the type of the variable x, which, in this
case, is the real type for real numbers. After deﬁning the new type, Normal (1:real)
is now of type :extreal. To simplify the notation and represent Normal 1 as 1, which
is in this case an extended real number (1:extreal), we use the following functions:
val extreal_of_num_def = Define ‘extreal_of_num n = Normal (&n)‘;
val _ = add_numeral_form (#"x", SOME "extreal_of_num");
All arithmetic operations of the real numbers need to be extended for the new type.
To do so, we deﬁne HOL functions over the new type and then overload the common
operators using these functions. For instance, we deﬁne the addition operation over
the extended-real numbers using the function extreal_add presented below, and
overload the + operator with this function. The function extreal_add extends the
addition as follows:
∀a. a = −∞ ⇒ a+ (+∞) = +∞+ a = +∞
∀a. a = +∞ ⇒ a+ (−∞) = −∞+ a = −∞
This is formalized in higher-order logic as:

 extreal_add (Normal x) (Normal y) = Normal (x + y) ∧
extreal_add (Normal _) a = a ∧
extreal_add b (Normal _) = b ∧
extreal_add NegInf NegInf = NegInf ∧
extreal_add PosInf PosInf = PosInf
The function is left undeﬁned when one of the operands is PosInf and the other is
NegInf. The + operator is then overloaded as
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val _ = overload_on ("+", Term ‘extreal_add’);
Similarly, we extend the other arithmetic operators and prove their properties.
val _ = overload_on ("-", Term ‘extreal_sub‘);
val _ = overload_on ("*", Term ‘extreal_mul‘);
val _ = overload_on ("/", Term ‘extreal_div‘);
val _ = overload_on ("≤", Term ‘extreal_le‘);
val _ = overload_on ("<", Term ‘extreal_lt‘);
val _ = overload_on ("~", Term ‘extreal_ainv‘);
val _ = overload_on ("numeric_negate", Term ‘extreal_ainv‘);
val _ = overload_on ("inv", Term ‘extreal_inv‘);
val _ = overload_on ("abs", Term ‘extreal_abs‘);
val _ = overload_on ("logr", Term ‘extreal_logr‘);
val _ = overload_on ("lg", Term ‘extreal_lg‘);
val _ = overload_on ("exp", Term ‘extreal_exp‘);
val _ = overload_on ("pow", Term ‘extreal_pow‘);
val _ = overload_on ("sqrt", Term ‘extreal_sqrt‘);
The order relation, for example, is extended as: ∀a ∈ R, −∞ ≤ a ≤ +∞.

 extreal_le (Normal x) (Normal y) = (x ≤ y) ∧
extreal_le NegInf a = T ∧
extreal_le b PosInf = T ∧
extreal_le c NegInf = F ∧
extreal_le PosInf d = F
With this order, R is a complete lattice where every subset has a supremum and an
inﬁmum.
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3.1.2 Supremum and Inﬁmum
The supremum or least upper bound of a set s ⊆ R is the least element of R that it is
greater than or equal to every element of s. We formalize the supremum in HOL as:

 extreal_sup p =
if ∀x. (∀y. p y ⇒ y ≤ x) ⇒ (x = PosInf) then PosInf
else (if ∀x. p x ⇒ (x = NegInf) then NegInf
else Normal (sup (λr. p (Normal r))))’;
In this deﬁnition, sup refers to the supremum over a set of real numbers.
The inﬁmum or greatest lower bound of a set s ⊆ R is the greatest element of R that
it is less than or equal to every element of s. We use the deﬁnition of supremum to
formalize the inﬁmum as:

 extreal_inf p = - extreal_sup (IMAGE numeric_negate p)
The function numeric_negate takes a set as an argument and returns a new set where
all the elements of the original set are negated. We overload the sup and inf operators
with these new deﬁnitions.
val _ = overload_on ("sup", Term ‘extreal_sup‘);
val _ = overload_on ("inf", Term ‘extreal_inf‘);
Next, we prove the following theorem in HOL, which we will use in the Radon Nikodym
theorem proof of Section 4.2.1.
Theorem 3.1. For any non-empty, upper bounded (by a ﬁnite number) set P of
extended real numbers, there exists a monotonically increasing sequence of elements
of P that converges to the supremum of P .
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Proof. For the case where the supremum is an element of the set, we simply consider
the sequence ∀n, xp(n) = supP . Otherwise, we prove that xp(n), deﬁned below, is
one such sequence.
xp(0) = @r. r ∈ P ∧ (supP − 1) < r and
xp(n+ 1) = @r. r ∈ P ∧ max(xp(n), supP − 12n+1 ) < r < supP

 xp(0) = @r. r∈P ∧ (sup P - 1) < r

 xp(n+1) = @r. r∈P ∧ max(xp(n), sup P - 12n+1) < r < sup P
where @ represents the Hilbert choice operator.
3.1.3 Summation over a Set
We then deﬁne the sum of extended real numbers over a ﬁnite set and prove its
properties whenever the sum is deﬁned. The obvious way to deﬁne the sum is the
following, where ITSET is the HOL function to iterate over sets,
val SIGMA_DEF = new_definition("SIGMA_DEF",
‘‘SIGMA f s = ITSET (λe acc. f e + acc) s (0:extreal)’’)
However, using this deﬁnition, we are not able to prove the recursive form without
requiring that all the elements we are adding are ﬁnite. In fact, to be able to prove
the recursive form, we need to use the theorem
∀f e s b.
(∀x y z. f x (f y z) = f y (f x z)) ∧ FINITE s ⇒
(ITSET f (e INSERT s) b = f e (ITSET f (s DELETE e) b))
This requires that the addition is associative and commutative for all the elements
considered, which is not the case unless we restrict our deﬁnition to ﬁnite values.
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This is, obviously, undesirable when working with extended-real numbers. Instead,
we propose the following deﬁnition for the sum.
val SIGMA_def = let open TotalDefn
in tDefine "SIGMA"
‘SIGMA (f:’a -> extreal) (s: ’a -> bool) =
if FINITE s then
if s={} then 0:extreal
else f (CHOICE s) + SIGMA f (REST s)
else ARB‘
(WF_REL_TAC ‘measure (CARD o SND)‘ THEN
METIS_TAC [CARD_PSUBSET, REST_PSUBSET])
end;
We use WF_REL_TAC to initiate the termination proof of the deﬁnition with the mea-
sure function measure (CARD o SND). We also use the ﬁrst-order decision procedure
METIS_TAC which we apply to the two theorems CARD_PSUBSET and REST_PSUBSET
stating that REST s is a proper subset of s and that the cardinal of a proper subset
of a set s is smaller than that of s. The functions CHOICE and REST return some
element of a set and the remaining subset obtained by excluding that element from
the original set, respectively.
From this deﬁnition, we prove the recursive form, which will be used in proving the
main properties of the sum.
∀f s. FINITE s ⇒
∀e. (∀x. x ∈ e INSERT s ⇒ f x = NegInf) ∨
(∀x. x ∈ e INSERT s ⇒ f x = PosInf) ⇒
(SIGMA f (e INSERT s) = f e + SIGMA f (s DELETE e))
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Notice that we can have inﬁnite values as long as the sum is deﬁned. The properties
that we proved include the linearity, monotonicity, and the summation over disjoint
sets and products of sets.
Finally, we deﬁne the inﬁnite sum of extended real numbers
∑
n∈N xn using the SIGMA
and sup operators and prove its properties.
val ext_suminf_def = Define
‘ext_suminf f = sup (IMAGE (λn. SIGMA f (count n)) UNIV)’
We provided an extensive formalization of the extended real numbers, which con-
sists of more than 220 theorems written in around 4500 lines of code. It contains
all the necessary tools to formalize most of the concepts that we need in measure,
integration, probability and information theories. In the next sections, we present the
formalization of these theories based on the extended-real numbers.
3.2 Formalization of Measure Theory in HOL
A measure is a way to assign a number to a set, interpreted as its size, and can be
considered as a generalization of the concepts of length, area, volume, etc. Two im-
portant examples are the Lebesgue measure on a Euclidean space and the probability
measure on a Borel space. The former assigns the conventional length, area and vol-
ume of Euclidean geometry to suitable subsets of Rn, n = 1, 2, 3 and the latter assigns
a probability to an event and satisﬁes the condition that the measure of the sample
space is equal to 1.
We provide a formalization of measure theory based on the Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory [21] with the famous Axiom of Choice (ZFC). This set theory is the most
common foundation of mathematics up to the present day and allows to avoid a
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number of paradoxes caused by the use of the naive set theory. The Axiom of Choice,
however, implies the existence of counter-intuitive sets and gives rise to paradoxes of
its own, in particular, the Banach-Tarski paradox [67], which says that it is possible
to decompose a solid unit ball into ﬁnitely many pieces and reassemble them into two
copies of the original ball, using only rotations and no scaling. This paradox shows
that there is no way to deﬁne the volume in three dimensions in the context of the ZFC
set theory and at the same time requires that the rotation preserves the volume, and
that the volume of two disjoint sets is the sum of their volumes. The solution to this
is to tag some sets as non-measurable and to assign a volume only to a measurable
set. Consequently, a measure function is deﬁned over a class of subsets called the
measurable sets and assigns a non-negative real number to every measurable set. It
satisﬁes the countable additivity condition which states that the measure of the union
of a collection of disjoint sets is equal to the sum of their measures.
3.2.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Let A be a collection of subsets (or subset class) of a space X. We deﬁne a predicate
subset_class in HOL that will test whether A is a subset class of X. This is
formalized in HOL as:

 subset_class X A = ∀s. s ∈ A ⇒ s ⊆ X
We also deﬁne the countable function that will test whether a set s is countable. A
set is countable if its elements can be counted one at a time, or in other words, if
there exists a surjective function f : N → s such that every element of the set s can
be associated with a natural number. This is formalized in HOL as:

 countable s = ∃f. ∀x. x ∈ s ⇒ ∃(n:num). f n = x
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Deﬁnition 3.1. (Sigma Algebra)
Let A be a collection of subsets (or subset class) of a space X. A deﬁnes a sigma
algebra on X iﬀ A contains the empty set ∅, and is closed under countable unions and
complementation within the space X.
We formalize a sigma algebra in HOL as follows:

 sigma_algebra (X,A) =
subset_class X A ∧ {} ∈ A ∧
(∀s. s ∈ A ⇒ X\s ∈ A) ∧
∀c. countable c ∧ c ⊆ A ⇒ ⋃c ∈ A
where X\s denotes the complement of s within X and ⋃ c the union of all elements
of c.
The pair (X,A) is called a σ-ﬁeld or a measurable space and A is the set of measurable
sets. We deﬁne the space and subsets functions such that

 space (X,A) = X

 subsets (X,A) = A
Trivial examples of a sigma algebra on a space X include the empty set, which is the
smallest sigma algebra on X and the powerset of X, P(X) which is comprised of all
subsets of X and is the largest sigma algebra on X.
For any collection G of subsets of X, we can construct σ(X,G), the smallest sigma
algebra on X containing G. σ(X,G) is called the sigma algebra on X generated
by G. There is at least one sigma algebra on X containing G, namely the powerset
of X. σ(X,G) is the intersection of all those sigma algebras. The sigma algebra on
X generated by G is formalized in HOL as:





c denotes the intersection of all elements of c.
Deﬁnition 3.2. (Measure Space)
A triplet (X,A, μ) is a measure space iﬀ (X,A) is a measurable space and μ : A → R
is a non-negative and countably additive measure function.
A probability space (Ω,A, p) is a measure space satisfying p(Ω) = 1. We formalize a
measure space in HOL as follows:

 measure_space (X,A,μ) =
sigma_algebra (X,A) ∧ positive (X,A,μ) ∧
countably_additive (X,A,μ)
A measure function is countably additive when the measure of a countable union
of pairwise disjoint measurable sets is the sum of their respective measures. The
countable additivity property is formalized in HOL as:

 countably_additive (X,A,μ) =
∀f. f ∈ (UNIV → A) ∧
(∀m n. m = n ⇒ DISJOINT (f m) (f n)) ∧
⋃
(IMAGE f UNIV) ∈ A ⇒
μ o f sums μ(
⋃
(IMAGE f UNIV))
In this deﬁnition, the countable union of subsets is captured through the domain of
the function f which is the set of natural numbers UNIV(:num) and the range of f
which is the set of measurable sets A. The function μ is then countably additive if
the sequence μ(f(n)) converges to μ(
⋃
n f(n)).
We deﬁne the helper functions m_space, measurable_sets and measure which take
a measure space as an argument and return the correspond component as follows:
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 m_space (X,A,μ) = X

 measurable_sets (X,A,μ) = A

 measure (X,A,μ) = μ
There is a special class of functions, called measurable functions, that are structure
preserving, in the sense that the inverse image of each measurable set is also mea-
surable. This is analogous to continuous functions in metric spaces where the inverse
image of an open set is open. Measurable functions will be used in the next sections
to deﬁne random variables.
Deﬁnition 3.3. (Measurable Functions)
Let (X1,A1) and (X2,A2) be two measurable spaces. A function f : X1 → X2 is called
measurable with respect to (A1,A2) (or (A1,A2) measurable) iﬀ f−1(A) ∈ A1 for all
A ∈ A2.
The HOL formalization is the following:

 f ∈ measurable a b =
sigma_algebra a ∧ sigma_algebra b ∧ f ∈ (space a → space b) ∧
∀s. s ∈ subsets b ⇒ PREIMAGE f s ∩ space a ∈ subsets a
The HOL function PREIMAGE denotes the inverse image of a function. Notice that
unlike Deﬁnition 3.3, the inverse image in the formalization needs to be intersected
with space a because the functions in HOL are total, meaning that they map every
value of a certain HOL type (even those outside space a) to a value of an appropriate
type which may or may not be in space b. In other words, writing in HOL that f
is a function from space a to space b, does not exclude values outside space a and
hence the intersection is needed.
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In this deﬁnition, we did not specify any structure on the measurable spaces. If
we consider a function f that takes its values on a metric space, most commonly the
set of real numbers or complex numbers, then the Borel sigma algebra on that space
is used. In the following, we present our formalization of the Borel sigma algebra in
HOL.
3.2.2 Borel Sigma Algebra
Working with the Borel sigma algebra makes the set of measurable functions a vector
space. It also allows us to prove various properties of the measurable functions nec-
essary for the formalization of the Lebesgue integral and prove its properties in HOL.
The Borel sigma algebra on a space X is the smallest sigma algebra generated by the
open sets of X. We use the sigma function we deﬁned earlier to formalize the Borel
sigma algebra.

 borel X = sigma X (open_sets X)
An important example, especially in the theory of probability, is the Borel sigma
algebra on R, denoted by B(R) which we simply call Borel in the sequel.

 Borel = sigma UNIV(:extreal) (open_sets UNIV)
where UNIV is the universal set of extended real numbers R. Clearly, the formalization
of the Borel sigma algebra, which is based on the open sets, requires the formalization
of some topology concepts of R. An earlier theory of the topology of R has been
developed in HOL by Harrison [28]. Unfortunately, it does not use the set theory and
also lacks some of the important theorems that we need in our development. Harrison,
later, developed an extensive topology theory [29] in HOL-Light. Additionally, a
formalization of the set of rational numbers Q is need in our work to prove, for
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instance, the various properties of B(R). A theory for the rational numbers was also
developed in HOL but does not include the theorems that we need and is in fact
unusable for our development because we need to work with rational numbers as a
subset of real numbers and not of a diﬀerent HOL type.
Rational Numbers
A rational number is any number that can be expressed as the quotient of two integers,
the denominator of which is positive. We use natural numbers and express Q, the
set of rational numbers, as the union of non-negative (Q+) and non-positive (Q−)
rational numbers.

 Q = {r | ∃ n,m. r = n
m
∧ m > 0} ∪ {r | ∃ n,m. r = −n
m
∧ m > 0}
We prove in HOL an extensive number of reassuring properties on the set Q as well
as a few other less straightforward ones, namely, Q is countable, inﬁnite and dense in
R.





A proof of this theorem in HOL is at the same time straightforward and tedious but
it is necessary to manipulate elements of the newly deﬁned set of rational numbers
and prove their membership to Q in the following theorems.
Theorem 3.3. The set of rational numbers Q is countable.
Proof. We prove that there exists a bijection f1 : N → N×N∗ from the set of natural
numbers N to the cross product of N and the set of positive natural numbers N∗. Let
f2 : N×N∗ → Q+ such that f2(a, b) = ab . and f = f2 ◦f1. Then ∀x ∈ Q+, there exists
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n ∈ N such that f(n) = x. This proves that Q+ is countable. Similarly, we prove that
Q− is countable and that the union of two countable sets is countable.
Theorem 3.4. (Q dense in R)
∀x, y ∈ R and x < y, there exists r ∈ Q such that x < r < y.
Proof. We start by deﬁning the ceiling of x as the smallest natural number larger
than x, denoted by x and prove that ∀x, x ≤ x and ∀x ≥ 0, x < x + 1. Let
x, y ∈ R such that x < y. We use the ceiling function and the Archimedean property
to construct r such that x < r < y.
Another deﬁnition that will be useful in our development is the set of open
intervals with rational end-points Ir = {]r1, r2[: r1, r2 ∈ Q}.

 open_intervals_set = {{x | a<x ∧ x<b} | a ∈ UNIV ∧ b ∈ UNIV}
We prove that Ir is countable by showing that the mapping Ir → Q × Q that sends
an open interval ]r1, r2[∈ Ir to the ordered pair of rational numbers (r1, r2) ∈ Q×Q is
injective, and that the cross product of two countable sets, Q in this case, is countable.
Topology
To deﬁne the Borel sigma algebra on R, we need some concepts of the topology of R
formalized in HOL. We could not use the formalization of topology by Harrison [28]
because it does not support extended real numbers, it does not use the set theory and
also lacks some of the important theorems that we need in our development. In the
following, we deﬁne the concepts of neighborhood and open set in R and prove the
required theorems.
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Deﬁnition 3.4. Let a ∈ A ⊂ R. A is a neighborhood of a iﬀ there exists a real
number d > 0 such that ∀x. |x − a| < d ⇒ x ∈ A. In other words, a is an interior
point of A.

 neighborhood A a = ∃d. 0<d ∧ ∀y. a - d < y ∧ y < a + d ⇒ y ∈ A
Deﬁnition 3.5. A set that is a neighborhood to all of its points in an open set.
Equivalently, if every point of a set is an interior point then the set is open.

 ∀A. open_set A = ∀x. x ∈ A ⇒ neighborhood A x
The following are some of the several properties related to open sets that we proved
in HOL.
Theorem 3.5. (Open Sets Properties)
Property 1: The empty set and the universal set are open.
Property 2: Every open interval is an open set.
Property 3: The union of any family of open sets is open.
Property 4: The intersection of a ﬁnite number of open sets is open.
Property 5: Every open set in R is the union of a countable family of open intervals.
Proof. We only show the proof for Property 5. Let A be an open set in R, then by
the deﬁnition of open set, for all x in A there exists an open interval containing x
such that ]a, b[⊂ A. Using the property of density of Q in R, there exists ]ar, br[⊂ A
containing x, ar and br being rational numbers. A is the union of a family of elements
of Ir which is then countable because Ir is countable.
Theorem 3.6. The inverse image of an open set by a continuous function is open.
40
Proof. Let A be an open set in R. From the previous theorem, A is a countable





f−1(Ai). Using Property 3, it
suﬃces to prove that the inverse image of an open interval is open. For this we use
the deﬁnition of a continuous function and the limit of a function to prove that any
point of f−1(Ai) is an interior point.
Borel Measurable Sets
We prove in this section that the Borel sigma algebra on the real line B(R) is generated
by the open intervals (]c, d[ for c, d ∈ R). This is actually used in many textbooks as
a starting deﬁnition for the Borel sigma algebra on R. While we will prove that the
two deﬁnitions are equivalent in the case of the real line, our formalization is vastly
more general and can be used for any metric space such as the complex numbers or
R
n
, the n-dimensional Euclidian space.
Theorem 3.7. B(R) is generated by the open intervals ]c, d[ where c, d ∈ R

 Borel = sigma UNIV (open_intervals_set)
Proof. The sigma algebra generated by the open intervals, σI , is by deﬁnition the
intersection of all sigma algebras containing the open intervals. B(R) is one of them
because the open intervals are open sets (Property 2). Hence, σI ⊆ B(R). Conversely,
B(R) is the intersection of all sigma algebras containing the open sets. σI is one of
them because every open set on the real line is the union of a countable collection of
open intervals (Property 5). Consequently B(R) ⊆ σI and ﬁnally B(R) = σI .
We also prove in HOL that B(R) is generated by any of the following classes of
intervals: ] −∞, c[, [c,+∞[, ]c,+∞[, ] −∞, c], [c, d[, ]c, d], [c, d], where c, d ∈ R. To
prove this result it suﬃces to prove that any interval ]c, d[ is contained in the sigma
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algebra corresponding to each class. For the case of the intervals of type [c, d[, this





, d[. For the open rays ] − ∞, c [, the
result follows from the fact that [a, b[ can be written as the diﬀerence of two rays,
[a, b[ = ] − ∞, b [ \ ] − ∞, a [. In a similar manner, we prove in HOL that all
mentioned classes of intervals generate the Borel sigma algebra on R. Another useful
result, asserts that the singleton sets are measurable sets of B(R).
Theorem 3.8. ∀c ∈ R, {c} ∈ B(R)

 ∀c:real. {c} ∈ subsets Borel
The proof of this theorem follows from the fact that a sigma algebra is closed under
countable intersections and the following equation.









3.2.3 Extended-Real-Valued Measurable Functions
Recall that in order to check if a function f is measurable with respect to (A1,A2),
it is necessary to check that for any A ∈ A2, its inverse image f−1(A) ∈ A1. The
following theorem states that, for extended-real-valued functions, it suﬃces to perform
the check on the open rays ((−∞, c), c ∈ R).
Theorem 3.9. Let (X,A) be a measurable space. A function f : X → R is measurable
with respect to (A,B(R)) iﬀ ∀c ∈ R, f−1((−∞, c)) ∈ A

 f ∈ measurable a Borel =
sigma_algebra a ∧ f ∈ (space a → UNIV) ∧
∀c. {x | f x < c} ∩ space a ∈ subsets a
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Proof. Suppose that f is measurable with respect to (A,B(R)), we showed in the
previous section that ∀c ∈ R, ] −∞, c[∈ B(R). Since f is measurable then f−1(] −
∞, c[) ∈ A. Now suppose that ∀c ∈ R, f−1(] − ∞, c[) ∈ A, we need to prove
∀A ∈ B(R), f−1(A) ∈ A. This follows from Property 5 stating that A is a countable






∞, c[) = ⋃n∈N f−1(]− n, c[)
In a similar manner, we prove in HOL that f is measurable with respect to (A,B(R))
iﬀ ∀ c, d ∈ R the inverse image of any of the following classes of intervals is an element
of A: ]−∞, c[, [c,+∞[, ]c,+∞[, ]−∞, c], [c, d[, ]c, d], [c, d].
Every constant real function on a space X is measurable. The indicator function on
a set A is measurable iﬀ A is measurable.
In the following, we prove in HOL various properties of the real-valued measurable
functions.
Theorem 3.10. If f and g are (A,B(R)) measurable and c ∈ R then cf , |f |, fn,
f + g, f ∗ g and max(f, g) are (A,B(R)) measurable.

 ∀a f g h c.
sigma_algebra a ∧
f ∈ measurable a Borel ∧
g ∈ measurable a Borel ⇒
((λx. c * f x) ∈ measurable a Borel) ∧
((λx. abs(f x)) ∈ measurable a Borel) ∧
((λx. f x pow n) ∈ measurable a Borel) ∧
((λx. f x + g x) ∈ measurable a Borel) ∧
((λx. f x * g x) ∈ measurable a Borel) ∧
((λx. max (f x) (g x)) ∈ measurable a Borel)
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Theorem 3.11. If (fn) is a monotonically increasing sequence of extended-real-valued
measurable functions with respect to (A,B(R)), such that ∀ x, f(x) = supn∈N fn(x)
then f is also (A,B(R)) measurable.

 ∀a f fi.
sigma_algebra a ∧
∀i. fi i ∈ measurable a Borel ∧
∀x. mono_increasing (λi. fi i x) ∧
∀x. x ∈ m_space m ⇒ f x = sup (IMAGE (λi. fi i x) UNIV)
⇒ f ∈ measurable a Borel
Theorem 3.12. Every continuous function g : R → R is (B(R),B(R)) measurable.

 ∀g. (∀x. g contl x) ⇒ g ∈ measurable Borel Borel
Theorem 3.13. If g : R → R is continuous and f is (A,B(R)) measurable then g ◦ f
is also (A,B(R)) measurable.

 ∀a f g. sigma_algebra a ∧ f ∈ measurable a Borel ∧
(∀x. g contl x) ⇒ g o f ∈ measurable a Borel
Theorem 3.12 is a direct result of Theorem 3.6 stating that the inverse image of an
open set by a continuous function is open. Theorem 3.13 guarantees, for instance,
that if f is measurable then exp(f), Log(f), cos(f) are measurable. This is derived
using Theorem 3.12 and the equality (g ◦ f)−1(A) = f−1(g−1(A)).
3.2.4 Products of Measure Spaces
We formalize products of measure spaces to be able to formalize measurable functions
deﬁned over product spaces. Let m1 = (X1,S1, μ1) and m2 = (X2,S2, μ2) be two
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measure spaces. The product of m1 and m2 is deﬁned to be the measure space
(X1 × X2,S, μ), where S is the sigma algebra on X1 × X2 generated by subsets of





μ2({y ∈ X2|(x, y) ∈ A}) dμ1
and S is deﬁned using the sigma operator which returns the smallest sigma algebra
containing a set of subsets, i.e., the product subsets in this case.
Let g(s1) be the function s2 → (s1, s2) and PREIMAGE denote the HOL function
for inverse image, then the product measure is formalized as

 prod_measure m1 m2 =
(λa. integral m1 (λs1. measure m2 (PREIMAGE g(s1) a)))
The integral in this deﬁnition is the Lebesgue integral for which we present the for-
malization in the next section. We veriﬁed in HOL that the product measure can be
reduced to μ(a1 × a2) = μ1(a1)× μ2(a2) for ﬁnite measure spaces.

 prod_measure m1 m2 (a1 × a2) = measure m1 a1 × measure m2 a2
We use the above deﬁnitions to deﬁne products of more than two measure spaces as
follows. X1×X2×X3 = X1× (X2×X3) and μ1×μ2×μ3 is deﬁned as μ1× (μ2×μ3).
We also deﬁne the notion of absolutely continuous measures where μ1 is said to be
absolutely continuous w.r.t μ2 iﬀ for every measurable set A, μ2(A) = 0 implies
μ1(A) = 0.
3.3 Formalization of Lebesgue Integration in HOL
Lebesgue integration [6] is a fundamental concept in many mathematical theories,
such as real analysis [23], probability [26] and information, which are widely used to
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model and reason about the continuous and unpredictable components of physical
systems. The reasons for its extensive usage, compared to the commonly known
Riemann integral, include the ability to handle a broader class of functions, which are
deﬁned over more general types than the real line, and its better behavior when it
comes to interchanging limits and integrals, which is of prime importance, for instance,
in the study of Fourier series.
3.3.1 Lebesgue Integral
Similar to the way in which step functions are used in the development of the Riemann
integral, the Lebesgue integral makes use of a special class of functions called positive
simple functions. They are measurable functions taking ﬁnitely many values. In other
words, a positive simple function g is represented by the triple (s, a, α) as a ﬁnite linear
combination of indicator functions of measurable sets (ai) that form a partition of the
space X.
∀x ∈ X, g(x) =
∑
i∈s
αiIai(x) ci ≥ 0 (3.1)
We also add the condition that positive simple functions take ﬁnite values, i.e., ∀i ∈
s. xi < ∞. Their Lebesgue integral can however be inﬁnite.
The Lebesgue integral is ﬁrst deﬁned for these functions and the deﬁnition is then
extended to non-negative functions and ﬁnally to arbitrary functions.
Deﬁnition 3.6. (Lebesgue Integral of Positive Simple Functions)
Let (X,A, μ) be a measure space. The integral of the positive simple function g with







This is formalized in HOL as
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 pos_simple_fn_integral m s a α =
SIGMA (λi. α i * measure m (a i)) s
While the choice of ((αi), (ai), s) to represent g is not unique, the integral as deﬁned
above is independent of that choice. Several properties of the Lebesgue integral of
positive simple functions such as the linearity and monotonicity have been proven
in [13]. We build on these results and extend them for our deﬁnition in which the
Lebesgue integral is extended-real valued.
We use the deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral of positive simple functions to deﬁne




f dμ = sup{
∫
X
g dμ | g ≤ f and g positive simple function} (3.3)
Its formalization in HOL is the following:

 pos_fn_integral m f =
sup {r | ∃g. r ∈ psfis m g ∧ ∀x. g x ≤ f x}
where psfis m g is used to represent the Lebesgue integral of the positive simple
function g. Finally, the integral for an arbitrary measurable function f is formalized
in terms of the integrals of f+ and f− where f+ and f− are the non-negative functions










Its formalization in HOL is the following.

 integral m f = pos_fn_integral m (fn_plus f) -
pos_fn_integral m (fn_minus f)
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3.3.2 Lebesgue Monotone Convergence
The Lebesgue monotone convergence is arguably the most important theorem of the
Lebesgue integration theory and it plays a major role in the proof of the Radon
Nikodym theorem [9] and the properties of the integral. We present in the sequel a
proof of the theorem in HOL.
Theorem 3.14. Let (fn) be a monotonically increasing sequence of non-negative mea-
surable functions such that ∀ x, f(x) = supn∈N fn(x), then
∫
X





The higher-order-logic formalization of the Lebesgue monotone convergence is the
following:

 ∀m f fi. measure_space m ∧ ∀i x. 0 ≤ fi i x ∧
∀i. fi i ∈ measurable (m_space m, measurable_sets m) Borel ∧
∀x. mono_increasing (λi. fi i x) ∧
∀x. x ∈ m_space m ⇒ f x = sup (IMAGE (λi. fi i x) UNIV) ⇒
pos_fn_integral m f =
sup (IMAGE (λi. pos_fn_integral m (fi i)) UNIV)
We prove the Lebesgue monotone convergence theorem by using the properties of
the supremum and by proving the lemma stating that if f is the supremum of a
monotonically increasing sequence of non-negative measurable functions fn and g is
a positive simple function such that g ≤ f , then the integral of g satisﬁes
∫
X





Or, as formalized in HOL:
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 ∀m f fi g r.
measure_space m ∧ ∀i x. 0 ≤ fi i x ∧
∀i. fi i ∈ measurable (m_space m, measurable_sets m) Borel ∧
∀x. mono_increasing (λi. fi i x) ∧
∀x. x ∈ m_space m ⇒ (f x = sup (IMAGE (λi. fi i x) UNIV)) ∧
r ∈ psfis m g ∧ ∀x. g x ≤ f x ⇒
r ≤ sup (IMAGE (λi. pos_fn_integral m (fi i)) UNIV)
3.3.3 Integrability
Our deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral, based on the extended-real numbers, ensures
that the integral is always deﬁned for non-negative functions even when the integral
is inﬁnite. In this section, we deﬁne the criteria of integrability for an arbitrary
measurable function and prove the integrability theorem which will play an important
role in proving the properties of the Lebesgue integral.




|f | dμ < ∞ or equivalently iﬀ ∫
X
f+ dμ < ∞ and ∫
X
f− dμ < ∞

 integrable m f =
f ∈ measurable (m_space m,measurable_sets m) Borel ∧
pos_fn_integral m (fn plus f) < ∞) ∧
pos_fn_integral m (fn minus f) < ∞)
We prove what we call the integrability theorem which has been used in some text-
books as a deﬁnition for integrability. This theorem provides also an alternative
deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral and plays an essential role to prove the properties
of the Lebesgue Integral.
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Theorem 3.15. For any non-negative integrable function f there exists a sequence of
positive simple functions (fn) such that ∀n, x, fn(x) ≤ fn+1(x) ≤ f(x) and ∀ x, fn(x) →
f(x). In addition, ∫
X





For arbitrary integrable functions, the theorem is applied to f+ and f− and results
in a well-deﬁned integral, given by
∫
X










 ∀m f. measure_space m ∧ integrable m f ⇒
∃fi ri.
∀x. mono_increasing (λi. fi i x) ∧
∀x. x ∈ m_space m ⇒
(fn_plus f x = sup (IMAGE (λi. fi i x) UNIV)) ∧
∀i. ri i ∈ psfis m (fi i) ∧
∀i x. fi i x ≤ fn_plus f x ∧
pos_fn_integral m (fn_plus f) = sup (IMAGE ri UNIV) ∧
∃gi vi.
∀x. mono_increasing (λi. gi i x) ∧
∀x. x ∈ m_space m ⇒
(fn_minus f x = sup (IMAGE (λi. gi i x) UNIV)) ∧
∀i. vi i ∈ psfis m (gi i) ∧
∀i x. gi i x ≤ fn_minus f x ∧
pos_fn_integral m (fn_minus f) = sup (IMAGE vi UNIV)
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that the sequence (fn), deﬁned below, sat-
isﬁes the conditions of the Lebesgue Monotone Convergence theorem. We apply this
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First, we use the deﬁnition of (fn) to prove in HOL the following lemmas

 ∀n x, 2n ≤ f(x) ⇒ fn(x) = 2n

 ∀n x and k < 4n, k
2n
≤ f(x) < k+1
2n
⇒ fn(x) = k2n

 ∀x, (f(x) ≥ 2n) ∨ (∃k, k < 4n and k
2n
≤ f(x) < k+1
2n
)
Using these lemmas we prove that the sequence (fn) is pointwise convergent to f
(∀ x, f(x) = supn fn(x)), upper bounded by f (∀n, x, fn(x) ≤ f(x)) and monotoni-
cally increasing (∀n, x, fn(x) ≤ fn+1(x)).
3.3.4 Integral Properties
Most properties of the Lebesgue integral cannot be proved directly from the deﬁni-
tion of the integral. Using the integrability theorem proven above, we can write the
Lebesgue integral of any non-negative function as the supremum of sequence of in-
tegrals of positive simple functions. Using the properties of the supremum and the
properties of the Lebesgue integral of positive simple functions, it is possible to prove
the integral properties of non-negative functions and then for arbitrary measurable
functions.
Let f and g be integrable functions and c ∈ R then





 ∀x, f(x) ≤ g(x) ⇒ ∫
X






























3.4 Summary and Discussions
We proposed in this chapter, a higher-order-logic formalization of the set of extended-
real numbers which we used to formalize measure theory and Lebesgue integration in
HOL. The formalization of measure theory includes the Borel sigma algebra allowing
us to deﬁne measurable functions over arbitrary topological spaces and prove their
properties. We formalized the Lebesgue Integral based on the extended-real numbers
and we proved its main properties and convergence theorems. Both measure theory
and Lebesgue integration formalization can be used to conduct the formal analysis of
a wide range of engineering systems and protocols. We use them in the next section to
formalize probability and information theory in HOL. The formalizations presented in
this chapter required, approximatively, 15000 lines of codes, including deﬁnitions and
theorems as well as their proofs. The formalization of extended-real numbers consists
of more than 220 theorems. The numbers of theorems in the formalization of measure
theory and Lebesgue integration are 120 and 100, respectively. It is worth mentioning
that this number keeps decreasing starting from the formalization of the extended-real
numbers and this can be explained by the way we are building the diﬀerent theories
on top of each other. This illustrates the advantage of the hierarchy we used to build






In this chapter, we make use of the formalizations of measure theory and Lebesgue
integration in HOL to provide a higher-order-logic formalization of probability theory.
The latter is then used to formalize the main concepts of information theory. Finally,
we give an overview of the quantitative analysis of information ﬂow which is gaining
lately a lot of interest in a wide range of applications, in particular, to evaluate the
performance of anonymity and privacy protocols.
4.1 Formalization of Probability in HOL
Probability provides mathematical models for random phenomena and experiments.
The purpose is to describe and predict relative frequencies (averages) of these ex-
periments in terms of probabilities of events. The classical approach to formalize
probabilities, which was the prevailing deﬁnition for many centuries, deﬁnes the prob-
ability of an event A as p(A) = NA
N
, where NA is the number of outcomes favorable to
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the event A and N is the number of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Prob-
lems with this approach include the assumptions that all outcomes are equally likely
(equiprobable) and that the number of possible outcomes is ﬁnite.
Kolmogorov [39] later introduced the axiomatic deﬁnition of probability, which
provides a mathematically consistent way for assigning and deducing probabilities of
events. This approach consists in deﬁning a set of all possible outcomes, Ω, called the
sample space, a set F of events which are subsets of Ω and a probability measure p
such that (Ω, F, p) is a measure space with p(Ω) = 1.
4.1.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 4.1. (Ω, F, p) is a probability space if it is a measure space and p(Ω) = 1.

 ∀p. prob_space p ⇔
measure_space p ∧ (measure p (p_space p) = 1)
A probability measure is a measure function and an event is a measurable set.

 prob = measure

 events = measurable_sets

 p_space = m_space
Deﬁnition 4.2. Two events A and B are independent iﬀ p(A ∩B) = p(A)p(B).
Here A ∩B is the intersection of A and B, that is, it is the event that both events A
and B occur.

 independent p a b ⇔
a ∈ events p ∧ b ∈ events p ∧
prob p (a ∩ b) = prob p a * prob p b
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Deﬁnition 4.3. X : Ω → R is a random variable iﬀ X is (F,B(R)) measurable
where F denotes the set of events. Here we focus on real-valued random variables but
the deﬁnition can be adapted for random variables having values on any topological
space thanks to the general deﬁnition of the Borel sigma algebra.

 random_variable X p s ⇔
prob_space p ∧ X ∈ measurable (p_space p,events p) s
The properties we proved in the previous section for measurable functions are obvi-
ously valid for random variables.
Theorem 4.1. If X and Y are random variables and c ∈ R then the following func-
tions are also random variables: cX, |X|, Xn, X + Y,XY and max(X, Y ).
Deﬁnition 4.4. Two random variables X and Y are independent iﬀ ∀A,B ∈ B(R),
the events {X ∈ A} and {Y ∈ B} are independent.
The set {X ∈ A} denotes the set of outcomes ω for which X(ω) ∈ A. In other words
{X ∈ A} = X−1(A).

 independent_rv p X Y s t ⇔
∀A B. A ∈ subsets s ∧ B ∈ subsets t ⇒
independent p (PREIMAGE X A ∩ p_space p) (PREIMAGE Y B ∩ p_space p)
The event {X ∈ A} is used to deﬁne the probability mass function (PMF) of a random
variable.
Deﬁnition 4.5. The probability mass function pX of a random variable X is deﬁned
as the function assigning to A the probability of the event {X ∈ A}.
∀A ∈ B(R), pX(A) = p({X ∈ A}) = p(X−1(A))
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 distribution p X = (λA. prob p (PREIMAGE X A ∩ p_space p))
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable is deﬁned as:
FX(x) = P (X ≤ x)
which we formalize in HOL as:

 CDF p X = (λx. distribution p X {y | y ≤ x})
We formalize the joint distribution of two random variables as:

 joint_distribution p X Y =
(λa. prob p (PREIMAGE (λx. (X x,Y x)) a ∩ p_space p))
The properties of the joint distribution that we proved in HOL include:

 pXY (a×b) = pY X(b×a)

 pXY (a×b) ≤ pX(a)

 pXY (a×b) ≤ pY (b)

 FINITE (p_space p) ⇒ SIGMA (λ(x,y). pXY {(x,y)}) (X(Ω)×Y(Ω)) = 1

 FINITE (p_space p) ⇒ pX(a) = SIGMA (λx. pXY (a×{x})) Y(Ω)

 FINITE (p_space p) ⇒ pY (b) = SIGMA (λx. pXY ({x}×b)) X(Ω)

 FINITE (p_space p) ⇒
SIGMA (λ(x,y). pXY {(x,y)} * f x) (X(Ω)×Y(Ω)) =
SIGMA (λx. pX{x} * f x) X(Ω)
The conditional distribution of a random variable X given the random variable Y is
formalized as:

 conditional_distribution p X Y =
(λa b. joint_distribution p X Y (a b) / distribution p Y b)
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4.1.2 Statistical Properties
In this section, we provide a formalization of the expectation, variance and covariance
of a random variable in HOL. These deﬁnitions use the Lebesgue integration formal-
ization and, hence, are valid for both discrete and continuous random variables.
Expectation
The expectation of a random variable is the weighted average of all its possible values.
Deﬁnition 4.6. The expectation of a random value X is deﬁned as the integral of X





 expectation = integral
We prove the following properties of the expectation of random variables:

 E[X+Y] = E[X] + E[Y]

 E[aX] = aE[X]

 E[a] = a

 X ≤ Y then E[X] ≤ E[Y]

 independent_rv X Y ⇒ E[XY] = E[X]E[Y]
As stated earlier, the deﬁnition of expectation is valid for both discrete and continuous
cases. We prove for the case where the sample space is ﬁnite, the deﬁnition of the
expectation can be simplied to:

 FINITE (p_space p) ⇒
E[X] = SIGMA (λr. r * distribution p X {r}) (IMAGE X (p_space p))
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We provide a simpliﬁed deﬁnition for the expectation of real-valued random variables,
which provides an easier way to compute the expecation of random variables with-
out the need to work with integrals. This formula is derived from Equation 3.5 in
Chapter 3.






×(FX(k+12n )-FX( k2n)) + 2n×(1-FX(2n))
The conditional expectation is formalized in the following HOL deﬁnition:

 conditional_expectation p X s =
@f. real_random_variable f p ∧ ∀g. g ∈ s ⇒
integral p (λx. f(x)Ig(x)) = integral p (λx. X(x)Ig(x))
Variance
The variance is another descriptor of probability distributions providing a measure
of how far the numbers are spread out around the expectation. The covariance is a
measure of the correlation between two random variables.
Deﬁnition 4.7. The variance of a random variable X is deﬁned as V ar(X) = E[|X−
E[X]|2]. The covariance of two random variables X and Y is deﬁned as Cov(X, Y ) =
E[(X − E[X])(Y − E[Y ])]. Two random variables X and Y are uncorrelated iﬀ
Cov(X, Y ) = 0.
Some of the properties that we veriﬁed in HOL for the variance and covariance include:

 Var(X) = E[X2] - E[X]2

 Cov(X,Y) = E[XY]-E[X]E[Y]

 Var(X) ≥ 0

 ∀a∈R, Var(aX) = a2Var(X)
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 Var(X+Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y) + 2Cov(X,Y)

 uncorrelated X Y ⇒ Var(X+Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y)






4.2 Formalization of Information Measures in HOL
Using the formalization of the foundational theories of measure, Lebesgue integra-
tion and probability, we are able to provide a higher-order-logic formalization of the
main concepts of information theory. We start by formalizing the Radon-Nikodym
derivative [23] and use it to deﬁne the KL divergence. The latter provides a uniﬁed
framework based on which we deﬁne the most commonly used measures of informa-
tion, those found in the main textbooks of Information Theory [14, 25, 22] such as
the Shannon entropy and mutual information. We start by providing the general
deﬁnitions which are valid for both discrete and continuous cases and then prove the
corresponding reduced expressions where the measures considered are absolutely con-
tinuous over ﬁnite spaces. We build on the foundations, presented in [13], to provide a
more general formalization of information theory including the properties of measures
of information.
4.2.1 Radon-Nikodym Derivative
The Radon-Nikodym derivative of a measure ν with respect to the measure μ is
deﬁned as a non-negative measurable function f , satisfying the following formula, for
any measurable set A [23]. ∫
A
f dμ = ν(A)
We formalize the Radon-Nikodym derivative in HOL as
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 RN_deriv m v =
@f. f IN measurable (X,S) Borel ∧
∀x ∈ X, 0 ≤ f x ∧
∀a ∈ S, integral m (λx. f x × Ia x) = v a
where @ denotes the Hilbert-choice operator. The existence of the Radon-Nikodym
derivative is guaranteed for absolutely continuous measures by the Radon-Nikodym
theorem stating that if ν is absolutely continuous with respect to μ, then there exists
a non-negative measurable function f such that for any measurable set A,
∫
A
f dμ = ν(A)
We proved the Radon-Nikodym theorem in HOL for ﬁnite measures which can be
easily generalized to σ-ﬁnite measures.

 ∀m v s st.
measure_space (s,st,m) ∧
measure_space (s,st,v) ∧
abs_cont (s,st,m) (s,st,v) ⇒
∃f. f ∈ measurable (s,st) Borel ∧
∀x ∈ s, 0 ≤ f x < ∞ ∧
∀a ∈ st, integral m (λx. f x × Ia x) = v a
The formal reasoning about the above theorem is primarily based on the Lebesgue
monotone convergence and the following lemma which, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been referred to in mathematical texts before
Lemma 1. If P is a non-empty set of extended-real valued functions closed under the
max operator, g is monotone over P and g(P ) is upper bounded, then there exists a
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Proof. Proving the Radon Nikodym theorem consists in deﬁning the set F of non-
negative measurable functions such that for any measurable set A,
∫
A
f dμ ≤ ν(A).
Then we prove that this set is non-empty, upper bounded by the ﬁnite measure of
the space and is closed under the max operator. Next, using the monotonicity of the
integral and the lemma above, we prove the existence of a monotonically increasing










Finally, we deﬁne the function g such that ∀x, g(x) = supn∈N fn(x) and prove that g
satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem by using the Lebesgue monotone convergence
theorem to prove that: ∫
X





We formally veriﬁed various properties of the Radon-Nikodym derivative. For in-
stance, we prove that for absolutely continuous measures deﬁned over a ﬁnite space,
the derivative reduces to

 ∀x ∈ s, u{x} = 0 ⇒
RN_deriv u v x = v{x}/u{x}
The following properties play a vital role in formally reasoning about the Radon-
Nikodym derivative and have also been formally veriﬁed.

 ∀x ∈ s, 0 ≤ RN_deriv m v x < ∞

 RN_deriv m v ∈ measurable (s,st) Borel

 ∀a ∈ st, integral m (λx. RN_deriv m v x × Ia x) = v a
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4.2.2 Kullback-Leibler Divergence
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [14] DKL(μ||ν) is a measure of the distance
between two distributions μ and ν. It can be used to deﬁne most information-theoretic
measures such as mutual information and entropy and can, hence, be used to provide
a uniﬁed framework to formalize most information leakage measures. It is because
of this reason that we propose to formalize the KL divergence in this paper as it
will facilitate the formal reasoning about a wide variety of information ﬂow related










is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν with respect to μ. The KL divergence
is formalized in HOL as:

 KL_divergence b m v = -integral m (λx. log b (RN_deriv m v x))
where b is the base of the logarithm. DKL is measured in bits when b = 2. We
formally verify various properties of the KL divergence. For instance, we prove that







 KL_divergence b u v = SIGMA (λx. u{x} log b (u{x} / v{x})) s
We also prove the following properties

 KL_divergence b u u = 0

 1 ≤ b ⇒ 0 ≤ KL_divergence b u v
The non-negativity of the KL divergence for absolutely continuous probability mea-
sures over ﬁnite spaces is extensively used to prove the properties of information
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theory measures like mutual information and entropy. To prove this result, we use
the Jensen’s inequality [56] and the concavity of the logarithm function.
We show in the subsequent sections how we use the KL divergence to formalize
mutual information, Shannon entropy, conditional entropy and the conditional mutual
information, which are some of the most commonly used measures of information.
4.2.3 Mutual Information
The mutal information I(X;Y ) of two random variables is a measure of the mutual
dependence of the two random variables in the sense that it measures how much
uncertainty about one of these variables is reduced when the other variable is known.
Mutual information has been proposed as a measure of information leakage [68] from
the secure inputs X of a program to its public outputs Y . It is deﬁned as the KL
divergence between the joint distribution and the product of marginal distributions.
The following is a formalization of mutual information in HOL.

 I(X;Y) = KL_divergence b (joint_distribution p X Y)
prod_measure (distribution p X)
(distribution p Y)
We prove various properties of mutual information in HOL, such as the non-negativity,
symmetry and reduced expression for ﬁnite spaces, using the result that the joint
distribution is absolutely continuous w.r.t the product of marginal distributions.

 0 ≤ I(X;Y)

 I(X;Y) = I(Y;X)

 I(X;Y) = 0 ⇔ independent_rv X Y

 I(X;Y) = SIGMA (λ(x,y). p{(x,y)} log b (p{(x,y)}/p{x}p{y})) s
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4.2.4 Shannon Entropy
The Shannon entropy H(X) is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a ran-
dom variable. Equivalently, it is a measure of the average information content missing
when the value of the random variable is unknown. The Shannon entropy was one of
the ﬁrst measures to be proposed to analyze anonymity protocols and secure commu-
nications [61, 19]. It can be deﬁned as the expectation of pX or simply as I(X;X).

 H(X) = I(X;X)
We prove that it can also be expressed in terms of the KL divergence between pX and
the uniform distribution puX , where N is the size of the alphabet of X.

 H(X) = log(N) - KL_divergence b (distribution p X)
(uniform_dist p X)
The cross entropy H(X, Y ) which measures how much entropy is contained in a joint
system of two random variables is the entropy of the random variable (X, Y ) and
hence there is no need for a separate formalization of the cross entropy.
The conditional entropy H(X|Y ) quantiﬁes the remaining uncertainty about the ran-
dom variable X given that the value of the random variable Y is known. It is deﬁned
in terms of the KL divergence as follows:

 H(X|Y) = log(N) - KL_divergence b (joint_distribution p X Y)
prod_measure (uniform_dist p X)
(distribution p Y)
The entropy properties that we prove in HOL include:

 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log(N)

 max(H(X),H(Y)) ≤ H(X,Y) ≤ H(X) + H(Y)
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 H(X|Y) = H(X,Y) - H(Y)

 0 ≤ H(X|Y) ≤ H(X)

 I(X;Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X,Y)

 I(X;Y) ≤ min(H(X),H(Y))

 H(X) = -SIGMA (λx. p{x} log b (p{x})) s

 H(X|Y) = -SIGMA (λ(x,y). p{(x,y)} log b (p{(x,y)}/p{y})) s
4.2.5 Conditional Mutual Information
The conditional mutual information I(X;Y |Z) allows one to measure the expected
value of mutual information of two random variablesX and Y given knowledge of Z. It
was used by Malacaria [44] as a measure of information leakage for a program with high
security inputsX, low security outputs Y and low security inputs Z. I(X;Y |Z) is then
a measure of how much information about the secret inputs is leaked to an attacker
by observing the outputs of a program given knowledge of the low security inputs.
The conditional mutual information is deﬁned as the KL divergence between the joint
distribution pXY Z and the product measure pX|ZpY |ZpZ . Its HOL formalization is as
follows:

 conditional_mutual_information b p X Y Z =
KL_divergence b (joint_distribution p X Y Z)
(prod_measure (conditional_distribution p X Z)
(conditional_distribution p Y Z)
(distribution p Y))
We formally verify the following reduced form of the conditional mutual information
for ﬁnite spaces by ﬁrst proving that pXY Z is absolutely continuous w.r.t pX|ZpY |ZpZ
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p(x, y, z) log
p(x, y, z)
p(x|z)p(y|z)p(z)
When the two random variables X and Y are independent given Z, the conditional
mutual information I(X;Y |Z) = 0. In fact, in this case,
∀x, y, z. p(x, y, z) = p(x, y|z)p(z) = p(x|z)p(y|z)p(z).

 indep_rv_cond p X Y Z ⇒ I(X;Y|Z) = 0
We also prove a few other important results regarding the conditional mutual infor-
mation which will be useful later in our work.

 0 ≤ I(X;Y|Z)

 I(X;Y|Z) = H(X|Z) - H(X|Y,Z)

 I(X;Y|Z) = I(X;(Y,Z)) - I(X;Z)

 I(X;Y|Z) ≤ H(X|Z)
The ﬁrst property is a direct result of the non-negativity of the KL divergence. We
will show next a proof of the second property. In the same manner we prove the third
property. Finally the fourth property is a result from the second property and the
non-negativity of the entropy.
I(X;Y|Z) =
∑








p(x, y, z) log(p(x|y, z)) - ∑p(x, z) log(p(x|z))
= - H(X|Y,Z) + H(X|Z)
So far, we have provided a higher-order-logic formalization of the KL divergence which
we used to deﬁne various measures of quantitative information ﬂow. This framework,
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along with the formalization of measure and probability theories, allows us to conduct
many analyses of quantitative information ﬂow using a theorem prover and hence
guaranteeing the soundness of the analysis.
4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Information Flow
A classical approach to protecting the conﬁdentiality of sensitive information is to use
a noninterference technique which aims to make it independent of the public output of
the protocol. Unfortunately, this cannot be applied to a large number of applications
where a small leak of information is intended by design to ensure the functionality
of the protocol. In an election protocol, for instance, while the votes should remain
secret, the election results should be made public. Similarly, a password checker
reveals some information when rejecting an incorrect password.
Quantitative analysis of information ﬂow [64, 58] is gaining a lot of attention in
a variety of contexts, such as secure information ﬂow, anonymity protocols, and side-
channel analysis. It allows to measure how much information about the high security
inputs of a system can be leaked, accidentally or maliciously, by observing the systems
outputs and possibly the low security inputs. Unlike non-interference analysis, which
only determines whether a system is completely secure or not completely secure,
quantitative information ﬂow analysis provides an information-theoretic measure on
how secure or insecure a system is.
Various measures are being proposed to quantify the ﬂow of information. Ser-
jantov [61] and Diaz et al. [19] independently proposed to use entropy to deﬁne the
quality of anonymity and to compare diﬀerent anonymity systems. In this technique,
the attacker assigns probabilities to the users after observing the system and does not
make use of any apriori information he/she might have. The attacker simply assumes
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a uniform distribution among the users before observation. Malacaria [44] deﬁned the
leakage of conﬁdential information in a program as the conditional mutual informa-
tion between its outputs and secret inputs, given the knowledge of its low security
inputs. Chatzikokolakis [10] modeled anonymity protocols as noisy channels and used
the channel capacity as a measure of the loss of anonymity. If it is equal to 0 then the
attacker can learn nothing more by observing the protocol. In the cases where some
leakage of information is intended by design as is the case in an election protocol,
for example, another measure for the loss of anonymity, the conditional capacity, was
proposed to take into account the intended leakage. In both cases however, there is
no analytical formula to compute the capacity and numerical algorithms have to be
used. Symmetry properties of channels, when present, can be exploited to compute
the capacity. Deng [18] used the notion of relative entropy to measure the degree of
anonymity that protocols can guarantee.
We introduce two new measures of information, namely the information leakage
degree and the conditional information leakage degree, which can be used to evaluate
the anonymity and security properties of various systems and protocols.
4.3.1 Information Leakage Degree
Consider a program having a set of secret inputs, represented by the random variable
X and a set of public outputs, represented by Y . We deﬁne the information leakage




where H(X) and H(X|Y ) represent the Shannon entropy of X and the conditional
entropy of X given Y , respectively.

 D p X Y = conditional_entropy p X Y / entropy p X
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To better understand the intuition behind this deﬁnition, let us consider the two
extreme cases of a completely secure program and a completely insecure program.
Complete security, intuitively, happens when the knowledge of the public output Y of
a program does not aﬀect the uncertainty about the secret input X. This is equivalent
to the requirement that X is independent of Y . In this case H(X|Y ) = H(X) and the
information leakage degree is equal to 1. On the other hand, when the output of the
program completely identiﬁes its secret input, the entropy H(X|Y ) is equal to 0 and
hence the information leakage degree is equal to 0 in this case of perfect identiﬁcation.
For situations between the two extremes, we prove that the information leakage degree
lies within the interval (0, 1).

 0 ≤ D p X Y ≤ 1
Using the properties of mutual information, I(X;Y ), we prove that the information
leakage degree is also equal to
D = 1− I(X;Y )
H(X)
This result illustrates the signiﬁcance of the information leakage degree deﬁnition since
mutual information measures how much information an adversary can learn about the
input X after observing the output Y . This also allows to compare our deﬁnition to
the anonymity degree proposed in [68] as
D′ = 1− I(X;Y )
logN
where N is the size of the alphabet of X. Our deﬁnition is more general. In fact,
when X is uniformly distributed, the two measures coincide D = D′. However, in
the general case, we believe that our deﬁnition is more accurate since, for instance,
in the perfect identiﬁcation scenario, D is always equal to 1 regardless of the input
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distribution. On the other hand, D′ is equal to 1 only in the special case of a uniform
distribution. In [68] the authors considered using H(X) as a normalization factor
instead of logN but opted for the latter arguing that the input distribution is already
accounted for in mutual information. But as stated previously, with the deﬁnition of
D′, the proof for perfect identiﬁcation is only valid for uniformly distributed inputs.
4.3.2 Conditional Information Leakage Degree
We propose another variation of information leakage degree that is more general and
can cover a wider range of scenarios. First, consider a program which has a set of
high security inputs S, a set of low security inputs L and a set of public outputs
O. The adversary wants to learn about the high inputs S by observing the outputs
O given the knowledge of the low inputs L. To capture this added information for
the adversary (low inputs), we propose the following deﬁnition, which we call the




This is formalized in HOL as

 D c p S L O =
conditional_entropy p S (O,L) / conditional_entropy p S L
Just like the previous case, consider the two extremes of perfect security and perfect
identiﬁcation. When the outputs and the secret inputs are independent, given L, the
conditional entropy H(S|(O,L)) is equal to H(S|L) which results in a conditional
leakage degree equal to 1 for perfect security. However, if the public inputs and
outputs completely identify the secret inputs, then H(S|(O,L)) is equal to 0 and so
is the conditional leakage degree in the case of perfect identiﬁcation. As in the case
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of leakage degree, we are also able to show that the conditional information leakage
degree lies within the interval (0, 1).

 0 ≤ D c p X Y Z ≤ 1
We also prove that the conditional information leakage degree can be written in terms
of the conditional mutual information and the conditional entropy.
Dc = 1− I(S;O|L)
H(S|L)
This shows that this deﬁnition is clearly a generalization of the information leakage
degree for the case of programs with additional low security inputs.
We provide more intuition to interpret this deﬁnition by proving the data pro-
cessing inequality (DPI) [14], which states that if the random variables X, Y and Z
form a Markov chain, then I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y ).
Deﬁnition 4.8. Random variables X, Y , Z are said to form a Markov chain in
that order (denoted by X → Y → Z) if the conditional distribution of Z depends
only on Y and is conditionally independent of X. Speciﬁcally, X, Y and Z form a
Markov chain X → Y → Z if the joint probability mass function can be written as
p(x, y, z) = p(x)p(y|x)p(z|y).
We formalize this in HOL as follows.

 markov_chain p X Y Z ⇔
∀x y z, pXY Z{(x,y,z)} = pX{x} * pY |X{y}{x} * pZ|Y {z}{y}
We prove that X → Y → Z is equivalent to the statement that X and Z are condi-
tionally independent given Y .

 markov_chain p X Y Z ⇔ indep_rv_cond p X Z Y
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In fact, p(x)p(y|x)p(z|y) = p(x, y)p(z|y) = p(x|y)p(z|y)p(y). This in turn is equivalent
to I(X;Z|Y ) = 0.

 markov_chain p X Y Z ⇔ I(X;Z|Y) = 0
This result allows us to prove the DPI as follows:

 markov_chain p X Y Z ⇒ I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y)
We prove the DPI theorem using the properties of mutual information. In fact, as
shown previously,

 I(X;(Y,Z)) = I(X;Z) + I(X;Y|Z)
By symmetry of mutual information, we also have

 I(X;(Y,Z)) = I(X;Y) + I(X;Z|Y)
Since I(X;Z|Y ) = 0 for a Markov chain,

 I(X;(Y,Z)) = I(X;Y)
Using the non-negativity of the conditional mutual information, it is straightforward
to conclude that

 I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y)
The data processing inequality is an important result in information theory that is
used, for instance, in statistics to deﬁne the notion of suﬃcient statistic. We make use
of the DPI to interpret the conditional information leakage degree. For a system with
high security inputs S, low security inputs L and outputs O, if the outputs depend
only on the low inputs, i.e., p(O|S, L) = p(O|L) then S → L → O and S and O are
conditionally independent given L. This is the perfect security scenario, for which
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Dc = 1. Using the DPI, we conclude that I(S;O) ≤ I(S;L). This means that when
the conditional mutual information leakage is equal to 1, no clever manipulation of
the low inputs, by the attacker, deterministic or random, can increase the information
that L contains about S, (I(S;L)).
4.4 Summary and Discussions
In this chapter, we used the formalization of measure theory and Lebesgue information
to provide a higher-order-logic formalization of the main concepts of probability and
information theory. We formalized the basic deﬁnitions of probability spaces and
random variables as well as their statistical properties. Based on the formalization
of the KL divergence, we deﬁned the most commonly used measures of information
including the Shannon entropy and mutual information. We have also introduced
two novel measures of information leakage that we will use in Chapter 5 to reason
about information ﬂow of real-world protocols and programs. The formalization of
probability presented in this chapter required around 3000 lines of code, including
basic deﬁnitions and proofs of 60 theorems. The formalization of information theory
required 3000 lines of code and 40 theorems. This is a great indication of the decreasing
trend of the number of theorems thanks to the hierarchy used within the framework.





In previous chapters, we provided a comprehensive framework that can be used in
the formal probabilistic and information-theoretic analysis of a wide range of systems
and protocols. We illustrate the usefulness of conducting this analysis using theorem
proving by tackling a number of applications including a data compression application,
the formal analysis of an anonymity-based MIX channel and the properties of the one-
time pad encryption system.
5.1 Data Compression
Data compression or source coding may be viewed as a branch of information theory in
which the primary objective is to reduce redundancy, minimizing the amount of data
to be stored or transmitted. It consists in encoding information using fewer bits than
an unencoded representation would use, through use of speciﬁc encoding schemes. As
depicted in Figure 5.1, data compression has important applications in the areas of
data storage and data transmission, for instance, in the speech compression for real-
time transmission over digital cellular networks. On the other hand, the proliferation
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Figure 5.1: Source Coding
of computer communication networks is resulting in massive transfer of data and the
growing number of data processing applications require storage of large volumes of
data. Compressing data reduces costs and increases capacity. However, to guarantee
reliable transmission or storage of data, particularly in systems for safety-critical
applications, a certain limit of compression must be respected.
We propose to formally prove an important result establishing the fundamental
limit of data compression. This result is also known as the Shannon source coding
theorem and states that it is possible to compress the data at a rate that is arbitrarily
close to the Shannon entropy without signiﬁcant loss of information. In other words,
n independent and identically distributed (iid) random variables with entropy H(X)
can be expressed on the average by nH(X) bits without signiﬁcant risk of information
loss, as n tends to inﬁnity. To the best of our knowledge, most of the formalization
framework that we need for this application, such as the properties of real valued
measurable functions, properties of the expectation of arbitrary functions, variance,
independence of random variables and the weak law of large numbers, is not available
in the open literature.
A proof of this result consists in proposing an encoding scheme for which the
average codeword length can be made arbitrarily close to nH(X) with negligible
probability of loss. We propose to perform a typical set encoding [14]. The typical
set contains the typical sequences which are used to represent the frequent source
symbols while the non-typical sequences represent rare source symbols.
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Figure 5.2: Typical Set Encoding
depicted in Figure 5.2. Clearly, we need to formalize the concept of a typical set and
prove its properties to be able to formally verify that the average codeword length
associated to the typical-set encoding can be made arbitrarily close to the Shannon
entropy with a vanishing probability of error. To prove the properties of the typical
set, we need to prove the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) [14, 25], which in
turn, requires the proof of the classical probability results, namely, the Weak Law of
Large Numbers (WLLN) and the Chebyshev inequality.
5.1.1 Chebyshev and Markov Inequalities
In probability theory, both the Chebyshev and Markov inequalities provide estimates
of tail probabilities. The Chebyshev inequality guarantees, for any probability dis-
tribution, that nearly all the values are close to the mean and it plays a major role
in the derivation of the laws of large numbers [49]. The Markov inequality provides
loose yet useful bounds for the cumulative distribution function of a random variable.
Let X be a random variable with expected value m and ﬁnite variance σ2. The
Chebyshev inequality states that for any real number k > 0,
P (|X −m| ≥ kσ) ≤ 1
k2
(5.1)
The HOL formalization of the Chebyshev inequality is stated as:

 random_variable X p Borel ∧
integrable p (λx. (Xx − E[X])2) ∧ 0 < k ⇒
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prob p {x | x ∈ Ω ∧ kVar[X] ≤ |X x - E[X]|} ≤ 1
k2
The Markov inequality states that for any real number k > 0,
P (|X| ≥ k) ≤ m
k
(5.2)
Its formalization in HOL is the following:

 random_variable X p Borel ∧ integrable p X ∧ 0 < k ⇒
prob p {x | x ∈ Ω ∧ k ≤ |X x|} ≤ E[X]
k
Instead of directly proving these inequalities, we provide a more general proof using
measure theory and Lebesgue integrals in HOL that can be used for both and a
number of similar inequalities. The probabilistic statement follows by considering a
space of measure 1.
Theorem 5.1. Let (S,S, μ) be a measure space, and let f be a measurable function
deﬁned on S. Then for any nonnegative function g, nondecreasing on the range of f,




g ◦ f dμ .

 ∀m f g t.
(let A = {x | x ∈ m_space m ∧ t ≤ f x} in
measure_space m ∧
f ∈ measurable (m_space m,measurable_sets m) Borel ∧
(∀x. 0 ≤ g x) ∧ (∀x y. x ≤ y ⇒ g x ≤ g y) ∧
integrable m (λx. g (f x)) ⇒
measure m A ≤ (1 / (g t)) * integral m (λx. g (f x)))
The Chebyshev inequality is derived by letting t = kσ, f = |X −m| and g deﬁned as
g(t) = t2 if t ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. The Markov inequality is derived by letting t = k,
f = |X| and g deﬁned as g(t) = t if t ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
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Proof. Let A = {x ∈ S | t ≤ f(x)} and IA be the indicator function of A. From the
deﬁnition of A, ∀x 0 ≤ g(t)IA(x) and ∀x ∈ A, t ≤ f(x). Since g is non-decreasing,
∀x g(t)IA(x) ≤ g(f(x))IA(x) ≤ g(f(x)). As a result, ∀x g(t)IA(x) ≤ g(f(x)). A is
measurable because f is (S,B(R)) measurable. Using the monotonicity of the integral,






g(f(x))dμ. Finally from the linearity of
the integral g(t)μ(A) ≤ ∫
S
g ◦ fdμ.
5.1.2 Weak Law of Large Numbers (WLLN)
The WLLN [49] states that the average of a large number of independent measure-
ments of a random quantity converges in probability towards the theoretical average
of that quantity. Interpreting this result, the WLLN states that for a suﬃciently
large sample, there will be a very high probability that the average will be close to
the expected value. This law is used in a multitude of ﬁelds. It is used, for instance,
to prove the AEP which is a fundamental concept in the ﬁeld of information theory.
Theorem 5.2. Let X1, X2, ... be an inﬁnite sequence of independent, identically dis-




i=1Xi then for any ε > 0,
lim
n→∞
P (|X −m| < ε) = 1 (5.3)

 prob_space p ∧ 0 < ε ∧
(∀i j. i =j ⇒ uncorrelated p (Xi) (Xj)) ∧
(∀i. E[Xi] = m) ∧ (∀i. Var[Xi] = v) ⇒
lim (λn. prob p {x | x ∈ Ω ∧ | 1
n
∑n
i=1Xi x - m| < ε}) = 1
Proof. Using the linearity property of the Lebesgue integral as well as the properties
of the variance, we prove that E[X] = 1
n
∑n





the Chebyshev inequality to X, we get P (|X−m| ≥ ε) ≤ σ2
nε2
. Equivalently, 1− σ2
nε2
≤
P (|X −m| < ε) ≤ 1. It then follows that limn→∞ P (|X −m| < ε) = 1.
5.1.3 Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP)
The Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) [14] is the information theory analog
of the Weak Law of Large Numbers. It states that for a stochastic source X, if its
time series X1, X2, . . . is a sequence of iid random variables with entropy H(X), then
− 1
n
log(p(X1, . . . , Xn)) converges in probability to H(X).
Theorem 5.3. (AEP): if X1, X2, . . . are iid then
− 1
n
log(p(X1, . . . , Xn)) −→ H(X) in probability
We formally verify the AEP using the WLLN result proved in the previous section
as well as the various properties of joint probability distributions, independence of
random variables and the log operator proved in Chapter 3.

 prob_space p ∧ 0 < ε ∧
(∀i j. i =j ⇒ independent_rv p (Xi) (Xj)) ∧
(∀i. E[Xi] = m) ∧ (∀i. Var[Xi] = v) ∧ (∀i. H[Xi] = H[X]) ⇒




i=1 pXi{x}) - H[X]| < ε}) = 1
Proof. LetX1, X2, . . . be iid random variables and let Yi = −log(pXi). Then Y1, Y2, . . .
































p(Xi)) = − 1
n




P (| − 1
n
log(p(X1 . . . Xn))−H(X)| < ε) = 1 (5.4)
5.1.4 Typical Set
A consequence of the AEP is the fact that the set of observed sequences (x1, . . . , xn) for
which joint probabilities p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) are close to 2
−nH(X) has a total probability
equal to 1. This set is called the typical set and such sequences are called the typical
sequences. In other words, out of all possible sequences, only a small number of
sequences will actually be observed and those sequences are nearly equally probable.
The AEP guarantees that any property that is proved for the typical sequences will
then be true with high probability and will determine the average behavior of a large
sample.
Deﬁnition 5.1. The typical set Anε with respect to p(x) is the set of sequences (x1, . . . , xn)
satisfying:
2−n(H(X)+ε) ≤ p(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ 2−n(H(X)−ε). (5.5)
The typical set has the following properties
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Theorem 5.4. if (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Anε then
H(X)− ε ≤ − 1
n
log(p(x1, . . . , xn)) ≤ H(X) + ε (5.6)
This theorem is a direct consequence of Deﬁnition 5.1.
Theorem 5.5. ∀ε > 0, ∃N, ∀n ≥ N, p(Anε ) > 1− ε.
The proof of this theorem is derived from the formally veriﬁed AEP. The next two
theorems give upper and lower bounds for the number of typical sequences |Anε |.
Theorem 5.6. |Anε | ≤ 2n(H(X)+ε).
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), then
∑
x∈Anε p(x) ≤ 1. From Equation 5.5, ∀x ∈ Anε ,
2−n(H(X)+ε) ≤ p(x). Hence ∑x∈Anε 2−n(H(X)+ε) ≤
∑
x∈Anε p(x) ≤ 1. Consequently,
2−n(H(X)+ε)|Anε | ≤ 1 proving the theorem.
Theorem 5.7. ∀ε > 0, ∃N.∀n ≥ N, (1− ε)2n(H(X)−ε) ≤ |Anε |.
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn). From Theorem 5.5, ∃N.∀n ≥ N, 1 − ε <
∑
x∈Anε p(x).




−n(H(X)−ε). Consequently, ∃N.∀n ≥ N, 1−ε < 2−n(H(X)−ε)|Anε |
proving the theorem.
5.1.5 Data Compression Limit
The main idea behind the proof of the source coding theorem is that the average
codeword length for all sequences is close to the average codeword length considering
only the typical sequences. This is true because according to the typical set properties
above, for a suﬃciently large n, the typical set has a total probability close to 1. In
other words, for any ε > 0, and suﬃciently large n, the probability of observing a
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non-typical sequence is less than ε. Furthermore, the number of typical sequences is
smaller than 2n(H(X)+ε) and hence no more than n(H(X) + ε) + 1 bits are needed to
represent all typical sequences.
If we denote by Y the random variable deﬁned over all the possible sequences
and returns the corresponding codeword length. The expectation of the Y is equal to
the average codeword length L. Using the properties of the typical set we can prove
that






Consequently, for any ε > 0 and n suﬃciently large, the code rate L
n
can be made as
close as needed to the entropy H(X) while maintaining a probability of error of the
encoder that is bounded by ε.
5.1.6 Discussions
In this application, we made use of the framework presented in previous chapters for
formally verifying the limit of data compression. This has the advantage of providing
an exact mechanical proof of the result, similar to the one obtained through paper-
and-pencil analysis, compared to less accurate results given by other computer based
simulation approaches. Compared to the paper-and-pencil based analytical method,
the correctness of the result is guaranteed by the soundness of the theorem prover.
Furthermore, the formal proof serves as a way to improve the formal speciﬁcation of
the problem, by focusing only on the necessary assumptions to prove the result and
ignoring the unnecessary ones.
To the best of our knowledge, this was the ﬁrst time the AEP has been formally
veriﬁed. This is also the ﬁrst formal proof of Chebychev and Markov inequalities that
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uses measure theory and Lebesgue integration and that can be applied to various
similar inequalities. The formalization of Shannon entropy, in Chapter 4, allowed us
to deﬁne the typical set and prove its properties. These proofs required approximately
3 weeks of human eﬀort and around 1000 lines of HOL code. The upside is that these
results can be reused in several other engineering applications.
Our formalization has inﬂuenced the work of Aﬀeldt et al [3], in which they
proved the Shannon’s theorems in the Coq proof assistants. In that work, the authors
provided a simpliﬁed formalization of the concepts involved instead of generalized
deﬁnitions that can be used in other applications, like we did in this thesis.
5.2 Anonymity-based Single MIX
In communication networks, privacy requires not only conﬁdentiality of the informa-
tion but also hiding the identities of the communicating parties. Several anonymous
networks have been proposed to ensure anonymous communication, e.g. Onion Rout-
ing [65], Tor [20], Crowds [54], Mixminion [16], etc. Most of the proposed solutions
are based on Chaum’s original idea of a threshold mix [11]. Mixes are relay nodes
that collect packets from diﬀerent users, shuﬄe them then forward them to their des-
tinations in such a way that an external eavesdropper cannot link an outgoing packet
to its corresponding sender.
In this section, we use our formalization to reason about an anonymity-based
single MIX, designed to hide the communication links between a set of senders and
a set of receivers. We model a single MIX as a communication node connecting m
senders (s1, . . . , sm) to n receivers (r1, . . . , rn). The single MIX is determined by its
inputs (senders), outputs (receivers) and the transition probabilities. We can also
add clauses in the speciﬁcation to capture additional information about the MIX like
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structural symmetry. The following is the formalization of the single MIX given in
Figure 5.3.

 MIX_channel s m X Y =
X(s) = {0;1} ∧ Y(s) = {0;1;2;3} ∧












Figure 5.3: Single MIX Example
Zhu and Bettati [68] used the single MIX to model an anonymity-based covert-channel
where a sender is trying to covertly send messages through the MIX. They used the
channel capacity as a measure of the maximum information that can be leaked through
the MIX and can be used as a measure of the quality of anonymity of the network.
A communication between a sender si and a receiver rj is denoted by [si, rj]. The
term p([su, rv]s|[si, rj]a) represents the probability that the communication [su, rv] is
suspected given that [si, rj] is actually taking place. This model describes attacks on
sender-receiver anonymity. The input symbols of the covert-channel are the actual
sender-receiver pairs [s, r]a and the output symbols are the suspected pairs [s, r]s. In
this case, p([s, r]s|[s, r]a) represents the result of the anonymity attack. We consider
the case where an attacker can establish a covert-channel by having 1 sender s1 com-
municate with any combination of j receivers. The same reasoning can be applied to
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multiple senders. The authors claim the following result [68]:
For a single sender s1 on a single mix, the maximum covert-channel capacity is
achieved when s1 can communicate to all receivers.
We initially tried to formally verify this result, using the foundational results pre-
sented in the previous chapters, but we found a counter-example for an assumption
upon which the paper-and-pencil proof of the above result is based. The erroneous
assumption states that the maximum of the mutual information is achieved when all
input symbols have non-zero probabilities regardless of the transition probabilities
(the results of the anonymity attack). We are able to prove in HOL that it is not
necessary for the sender s1 to communicate with all receivers to achieve capacity.
First, we provide a higher-logic-formalization of the channel capacity which is
deﬁned as the maximum, over all input distributions, of the mutual information be-
tween the input and the output of the channel. We formalize it in HOL using the
formalization of mutual information from Chapter 4 and the Hilbert-choice operator;
i.e., if it exists, the capacity is some c such that c = Im(X;Y ) for some probability
distribution m and for any input distribution p, Ip(X;Y ) ≤ c.

 capacity s X Y = @c. (∃m. c = Im(X;Y )) ∧ (∀m. Im(X;Y ) ≤ c)
Next, consider the covert-channel depicted in Figure 5.4. To simplify the no-
tation, let xi = [s1, ri]a and yi = [s1, ri]s. This covert-channel is formalized in HOL
as

 MIX_channel_1 s m X Y =
(X(s) = {0;1;2}) ∧ (Y(s) = {0;1;2}) ∧
















Figure 5.4: Counter-Example for [68]
(pY |X {0}{0} = 1) ∧ (pY |X {0}{1} = 12) ∧ (pY |X {0}{2} = 0) ∧
(pY |X {1}{0} = 0) ∧ (pY |X {1}{1} = 0) ∧ (pY |X {1}{2} = 0) ∧
(pY |X {2}{0} = 0) ∧ (pY |X {2}{1} = 12) ∧ (pY |X {2}{2} = 1)
We prove that its mutual information is equal to 2p.

 ∀X Y s. MIX_channel_1 s m X Y ⇒
I(X;Y) = 2 * p X {0}
We also prove that the capacity is equal to 1 and corresponds to p = 1
2
. This means
that the input distribution that achieves the channel capacity is [p{x0} = 12 , p{x1} =
0, p{x2} = 12 ]. Hence, we prove that the sender s1 does not need to communicate
with the receiver r2 and still achieve maximum capacity, contradicting the result
in [68]. Notice that with p = 1
2
, I(X;Y ) = H(X) = 1 which implies that the degree
of information leakage D = 0. So for this covert-channel, the maximum capacity
corresponds to perfect identiﬁcation.
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5.2.1 Discussions
Unlike the paper-and-pencil based analysis, a machine-assisted analysis of quantita-
tive information ﬂow using theorem proving guarantees the accuracy of the results.
In fact, the soundness of theorem proving inherently ensures that only valid formulas
are provable. The requirement that every single step of the proof needs to be derived
from axioms or previous theorems using inference rules, allows us to ﬁnd missing as-
sumptions and even sometimes wrong statements as was the case in this single MIX
application. We were able to detect the problem with the reasoning described in the
above sections and conﬁrm the result using our formalization in HOL. In this spe-
ciﬁc case, we detected the problem when trying to prove the erroneous assumption
stating that the channel capacity is achieved when all input symbols have non-zero
probabilities. This result contradicts Theorem 4.5.1 of [22], which inspired us to come
up with the counter-example. Our analysis has also been conﬁrmed by Prof. Gal-
lager from MIT, the author of the much cited book Information Theory and Reliable
Communication [22].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time the properties of mixes
have been analyzed using theorem proving. This is obviously not a large application
and can be extended to reason about MIX networks and other anonymity networks
in general. However this serves as an example to illustrate the usefulness of the
framework presented in this thesis. Thanks to the rich formalization we provided in
Chapters 3 and 4, we were able to analyze the MIX of this application within one
week of human eﬀort and using around 500 lines of HOL code.
87
5.3 One-Time Pad
The one-time pad is a simple yet solid encryption system that provides, if used cor-
rectly, an unbreakable security. The encryption is performed by modular addition of
every character of the plaintext with a character from a secret random key of at least
the same length as the original message. If the key is truly random and never reused
in whole or in part, then it can be proven that the one-time pad encryption provides
a perfect security. We formally prove this property within the HOL4 theorem prover
using the higher-order-logic framework proposed in this thesis.
The one-time pad encryption technique takes its name from the paper pads that
have been historically used to distribute the keys, making it easy to simply pull the
top sheet of the pad and destroy it after use. An example of a Russian one-time pad
that was captured by MI5 is depicted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: A Russian One-time pad, captured by MI5 [53]
The one-time pad has been extensively used to secure the communications of
various international intelligence agencies and was used for instance in the Washing-
ton/Moscow hotline to provide perfectly secure communication between the White
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House and the Kremlin and without disclosing any other secret cryptographic tech-
nology.
The main challenges for this encryption technique are the generation of truly
random keys and their distribution to both sender and receiver. This sometimes makes
the technique impractical and limits the types of its applications to the cases where,
for example, absolute security is a real must, regardless of the costs. Still, the one-
time pad is available as a backup encryption option if other theoretically less secure
but more practical encryption systems are unavailable for reasons of war or attacks.
The one-time pad encryption is also very important in situations, where both sender
and receiver need to do all the work by hand without the use of a computer, whether
because one is not available or to avoid possible vulnerabilities of a standard computer.
The structure of a typical one-time pad encryption system is depicted in Fig-
ure 5.6. The plaintext is ﬁrst encoded into digits or bits then fed to the encryption
block which performs a modular addition (modulo 10) to produce a cipher text. The
latter is transmitted to the receiver side which performs the inverse operations to














Figure 5.6: One-Time Pad Encryption
89
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A T O N E S I R
2 B C D F G H J K L M
6 P Q U V W X Y Z . /
Table 5.1: Straddling Checkerboard Example
5.3.1 Encoding - Decoding
We use a straddling checkerboard to convert the alphabetic plaintext into digits. With
this conversion scheme, the more frequent letters in a language are encoded with a
lower number of digits, leading to a compressed output and, hence, shorter messages
to be transmitted. Besides, a straddling checkerboard allows to achieve a simple form
of information diﬀusion, or in other words, it reduces the redundancy in the statistics
of the plaintext. An example checkerboard for the English language can be found in
Table 5.1. We formalize the straddling checkerboard as the function checkerboard
of the HOL type:

 checkerboard: char -> num
We present the deﬁnition of checkerboard associated with Table 5.1 for the ﬁrst-row
letters as well as P and /.

 (checkerboad #’’A’’ = 0) ∧
(checkerboad #’’T’’ = 1) ∧
(checkerboad #’’O’’ = 3) ∧
(checkerboad #’’N’’ = 4) ∧
(checkerboad #’’E’’ = 5) ∧
(checkerboad #’’S’’ = 7) ∧
(checkerboad #’’I’’ = 8) ∧
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(checkerboad #’’R’’ = 9) ∧
(checkerboad #’’P’’ = 60) ∧
(checkerboad #’’/’’ = 69)
Using the above deﬁnition of the straddling checkerboard, we formalize the encoding
and decoding blocks as encode and decode functions, respectively. The encoder takes
as input a string representing the alphabetic plaintext which it decomposes into a list
of characters, each of which is processed through the checkerboard, and returns a list
of digits. The decoder performs the inverse operations to convert a list of digits back
to a string. The functions encode and decode have the following HOL types:

 encode: string → num list

 decode: num list → string
5.3.2 Encryption - Decryption
The ecryption and decryption blocks are formalized as two functions, encrypt and
decrypt, taking as input a pair of same length lists of digits and returning a list of
digits.

 encrypt:(num list,num list) → num list

 decrypt:(num list,num list) → num list
The encryption is performed by a modulo10 addition, digit by digit, of the list repre-
senting the encoded message and the list of digits representing the one-time pad key.
The result of this operation is a ciphertext which is also represented by a list of digits.
On the receiver side, the ciphertext is decrypted by subtracting, modulo10, the key
from ciphertext, resulting into a list of numbers that represent the original message.
In the case where the plaintext is encoded into bits instead of digits, both encryption
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and decryption are performed by a simple XOR operation. We formalize encrypt in
higher-order logic, recursively. h1 and h2 represent the ﬁrst elements or heads of the
lists and t1 and t2 their tails. The :: operator is the list constructor.

 encrypt ([],[]) = [] ∧
∀t1 t2 h1 h2.
encrypt (h1::t1,h2::t2) =
(h1+h2) MOD 10::encrypt (t1,t2)
Similarly, we formalize the decryption block as follows.

 decrypt ([],[]) = [] ∧
∀t1 t2 h1 h2.
decrypt (h1::t1,h2::t2) =
(h1-h2) MOD 10::decrypt (t1,t2)
Finally, let m be the original message (plaintext), k be the one-time pad key and r
be the received message after decryption and decoding. The one-time pad (OTP)
encryption is then formalized in HOL using the following predicate.

 ∀ m k r.
OTP m k r ⇔
r = decode(decrypt(encrypt(encode m,k),k))
As a reassuring property, we prove in HOL that the one-time pad as designed and
formalized above, ensures that the received message is equal to the original message.

 ∀ m k r. OTP m k r ⇒ (r = m)
92
5.3.3 Perfect Security
We formally verify that the one-time pad provides perfect security by proving that
the information leakage degree, formalized in Chapter 4 Section 4.3, is equal to one.
Let M,C and K denote the random variables representing the plaintext, cipher-
text and keys, respectively. Hence, K is uniformly distributed and is independent of
M , which allows us to prove that

 ∀ m ∈ M, c ∈ C.
P(M = m | C = c) = P(M = m)
This follows from the following lemmas, which we prove using the properties we for-
mally proved in Chapter 4 about probability distributions.

 P(M = m | C = c) = P(M = m, C = c) / P(C = c)

 P(M = m, C = c) = P(M = m, K = m ⊕ c)

 P(M = m, K = m ⊕ c) = P(M = m) P(K = m ⊕ c)

 P(K = m ⊕ c) = 2−n

 P(C = c) = 2−n
Next, we prove that the conditional entropy of M given C is equal to the entropy of
M and that the mutual information I(M ;C) is equal to zero.

 H(M|C) = H(M)

 I(M;C) = 0
Finally, it follows that the information leakage degree is equal to 1, meaning that the
one-time pad encryption is information-theoretically secure and there is no leakage of
information about the secret input (plaintext) to a possible eavesdropper.

 D(M,C) = 1
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5.3.4 Discussions
In this application, we were able to formally prove the perfect security property of the
OTP encryption system thanks to the various properties of probability distributions
presented in Section 4.1 of Chapter 4 as well as the properties of the Shannon entropy
and mutual information from Section 4.2 of the same Chapter. Theorem proving
allows to provide a generic result that does not depend on which message has been
encrypted, unlike the kind of results produced by computer simulation. If fact, simu-
lation can be used to detect the presence of bugs but is not useful to guarantee their
absence. The formalization of the diﬀerent components of the OTP as well as the
proof of its security property required around two weeks of human eﬀort and around
800 lines of code.
5.4 Summary and Discussions
In this chapter, we have veriﬁed some classical results of probability theory, namely,
the Shebyshev and Markov inequalities and the Weak Law of Large Numbers. We used
these results to formally verify the Asymptotic Equipartition Property, an important
property used in the proofs of numerous information-theoretic theorems. We use
the AEP to verify the properties of a typical encoder that is used in the formal
proof of the Shannon source coding theorem. We have also presented two example
applications of the use of quantitative analysis within a theorem prover to analyse
the properties of an anonymity-based MIX channel as well as the properties of the
one-time pad encryption. In the ﬁrst example, we were able to detect a problem
and come up with a counter-example to a result that was reported in a prominent
paper [68]. In the second example, we were able to formalize the encryption system,
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verify its functionality as well as prove a generic result about its perfect security. The
soundness and the deduction style of the theorem prover guarantee the validity of the
analysis when deriving these proofs. Besides, the results of this type of analysis are
generic and valid for any instance of the system. We argue that these beneﬁts are
even more signiﬁcant when dealing with larger and more complex systems as is the
case for nowadays parallel and distributed systems.
These applications illustrate how our formalization of information theory and
the diﬀerent underlying theories of measure, Lebesgue integration and probability,
can be used to reason about a multitude of engineering applications. Conducting the
analysis within the sound core of a theorem prover helped to add more trust to the
proved results. It allowed to detect a bug in the paper-and-pencil analysis of the MIX
channel example. While the formalization of the diﬀerent theories required more than
20,000 lines of code, the applications of this chapter have only required around 800




Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have proposed to conduct the information-theoretic analysis of sys-
tems and protocols using a higher-order-logic theorem prover. To do so, we proposed
a formal framework of all the tools needed to describe the system under consideration
and its desired properties in a formal language that can be used within the theorem
prover and make it possible to formally analyze these properties. Compared to the
standard techniques of computer simulation and paper-and-pencil analysis, our ap-
proach allows to exploit the soundness of theorem proving to deliver more accurate
and trusted results. It also allows to provide generic results instead of proving the
properties for speciﬁc instances of the system.
The framework we provided consists in a higher-order-logic formalization of the
main concepts of information theory along with the formalization of the underlying
theories of measure, Lebesgue integration and probability. We formalized the most
commonly used measures of information starting with the KL divergence which we
used to deﬁne the other measures like the Shannon entropy and mutual information.
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This provides the tools necessary to perform the quantitative analysis of information
for various applications like the evaluation of performance of various anonymity and
security protocols.
We provided generalized formalizations of measure and Lebesgue integration
which are based on the extended-real numbers and the Borel sigma algebras. Using
this, we formalized the main concepts of probability and veriﬁed a number of classical
results. The way these theories have been formalized, allows to work with discrete and
continuous random variables in a uniﬁed framework where the properties are valid for
both cases. We then provided simpliﬁcations of the theorems in the cases of ﬁnite or
countable spaces.
While we built on previous research for the diﬀerent theories, to the best of
our knowledge, our work provides the most generalized formalizations as has been
discussed in the previous chapters. Furthermore, we introduced, in this thesis, two
novel measures of information leakage that can be used, for instance, in the evaluation
of anonymity and privacy protocols. Our work has been accepted to be part of the
oﬃcial release of the HOL4 theorem prover, but it can also be adopted for any other
higher-order-logic theorem prover.
Finally, we illustrated the usefulness of our approach and formal framework by
tackling several applications in the areas of communication, anonymity and privacy.
We proved the properties of a typical encoder used in the proof of the Shannon source
coding theorem. We also analyzed an anonymity based single MIX that was proposed
in the prominent paper of Zhu and Bettati [68]. We were able to ﬁnd an error in the
paper-and-pencil analysis presented in the paper thanks to the soundness of theorem
proving. We oﬀered a counter-example to the result proposed in [68] to conﬁrm our
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analysis. Finally, we used our framework to formally prove the perfect security prop-
erty of the one-time pad encryption. These applications highlight the feasibility and
beneﬁts of conducting the information-theoretic analysis using a higher-order-logic
theorem prover. In fact, the added trust provided by the deduction style of theorem
proving, is a crucial requirement when dealing with safety-critical applications. An-
other beneﬁt of this approach is the generic results that are guaranteed to be valid
for every single instance of the system. These beneﬁts are even more signiﬁcant for
larger and more complex systems.
6.2 Future Work
Information theory has been an important basis for the analysis of a wide range
of applications, especially in the ﬁelds of communication and cryptography. This
thesis lays the ground to a promising approach for the information-theoretic analysis
of safety-critical applications. Building on the formalization and veriﬁcation results
presented in this thesis, several extensions can be explored to further strengthen the
proposed framework. Some future research directions are outlined below.
• While using the extended-real numbers made it possible to provide a more gen-
eralized formalization of measure and Lebesgue integration, it added some com-
plexity to the proofs. It is possible to simplify these proofs by creating a simpli-
ﬁcation set ext_ss which contains the most used theorems of the extended-real
numbers theory, especially the various properties of the operators. Creating
tactics and decision procedures for this purpose is also an interesting extension
that needs to be explored.
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• The probability density function (PDF) is deﬁned as the Radon Nikodym deriva-
tive of the cumulative distribution function with respect to the probability mea-
sure. Formalizing the PDF allows to analyze the class of systems that can be
described by standard continuous distributions such as the normal distribution.
The latter can be used to model a wide class of systems due to the central limit
theorem. A formal proof of this theorem can also be an interesting extension
to the formalization developed in this thesis. Finally, formalizing the PDF al-
lows to write the statistical properties of random variables, like the expectation,
in terms of the density function and hence can be useful in the evaluation of
continuous systems.
• The deﬁnition of the Borel sigma algebra is based on the open sets which can be
used to deﬁne the Lebesgue integral for functions ranging over Euclidian spaces.
On the other hand, our formalization is general enough to handle functions of
multiple variables. The integral of these functions is what is called the multiple
integral. The formalization can be enriched by proving the properties of multiple
integrals such as under which conditions it is possible to change the order of the
integrals, which can be useful in many cases to simplify the computation of the
multiple integral.
• Our formalization can also be enriched by porting some of the concepts that
have been developed by Abbasi [1] to perform the reliability analysis of engi-
neering systems. We believe that our formalization of probability is more suited
to conduct this analysis since it allows to prove the general properties of the
system regardless of which probability distribution is used. The uniﬁed frame-
work for discrete and continuous random variables is another advantage of this
porting. More importantly, our formalization does not require the independence
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of random variables and hence can be used to analyse a larger class of systems.
• Crowds [54] and Tor [20] are two of the main solutions proposed to provide
anonymity in communication networks. The evaluation of the performance of
these networks is an interesting application of the approach proposed in this
thesis. The measures of information leakage proposed in this thesis can be
used to quantify the leakage of information for diﬀerent conﬁguration of these
networks. Conducting the analysis using theorem proving provides accurate
analysis and generic results.
• Building on the data compression application, jointly typical sets and the notion
of communication channel and codes can be formalized allowing to prove the
Shannon channel coding theorem as well as other coding theorems. This will
constitutes an important step to formalize digital communication systems and
evaluate their performances.
• A mix network [59] consists of several interconnected stages or single mixes.
the interconnection of the stages determines the network topology. The single
mix application of this thesis can be extended by formalizing mix networks
as well as the basic attacks and adversary models in the networks. This will
allow to reason about several real-world applications like electronic voting and
anonymous email and telecommunications.
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